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I. INTRODUCTION
Much recent discourse in the international arena has focused on glob-
alization and interdependence.1 One international legal instrument that
could facilitate the internationalization of markets would be the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,2 often
"Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, Saint Paul, Minnesota. Sincere
thanks are due to my colleagues at William Mitchell who reviewed and commented on an
earlier draft of this article: Professors Matthew Downs, Daniel Kleinberger and Russell Pan-
nier. My research assistants were Stephen L. Miller and Leah M. DiOrio. The contributions
of all were deeply appreciated; any errors and misjudgments contained herein are entirely
my own.
1 See, e.g., Jerome I. Levinson, The International Financial System: A Flawed Architec-
ture, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1 (1999); Saskia Sassen, Global Financial Centers, FOPGN
AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 75; James Gustave Speth, A New Deal: Development Assistance in a
Global Economy, HARv. INT'L REV., Winter 1998/1999, at 48; Ethan B. Kapstein, A Global
Third Way: Social Justice and the World Economy, WORLD POL'Y J., Winter 1998/1999, at 23.
2 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Official Records, Annex 1, at 178-90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980); 1489
U.N.T.S. 3; English version also printed at 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264 (1987) and 19 I.L.M.
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called the "CISG Convention." Initially signed in 1980 as the culmination
of proceedings involving representatives from 62 countries,3 the CISG
Convention originally entered into force in 1988, when it had accumulated
the first ten national ratifications4 required by its terms.5 At the present
time, at least 51 countries have become adherent states, or "Contracting
Parties," under the Convention.
6
The CISG Convention is designed to serve as a sort of global statutory
code for sales of goods, when the sales take place between parties located in
different countries. As such, the Convention was intended to replace the
domestic law of sales in each ratifying jurisdiction, insofar as international
transactions are concerned. Readers in the United States can visualize the
Convention as a rough counterpart to UCC Article 2, the Article of the Uni-
form Commercial Code dealing with sales of goods, except that the CISG
only applies to transactions that satisfy its criteria of internationality7 and
has a different structure and vocabulary.
Within the United States, the Convention's effect is thus to replace
UCC Article 2 for the international transactions to which the Convention
applies.8 Article 2 generally remains in effect for purely domestic transac-
tions, and for transactions with foreign counterparties located in countries
not parties to the CISG, when United States domestic law governs these
transactions. Accordingly, within the United States there are now two dis-
tinct regimes of sales law: Article 2 and the CISG.9
668 (1980); U.S. text codified at 15 U.S.C.A. App. at 52 (West Supp. 1997) [hereinafter
CISG].
3 See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 54 (2d ed. 1991) [hereinafter HONNOLD TREATISE].
4See JOHN 0. HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INTERNATIONAL SALES 1, n.l (1989) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. The ninth, tenth
and eleventh states to deposit instruments of ratification or accession were Italy, China and
the United States. Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 International Sales Convention, 16
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 707, 708 (1986).
5 CISG art. 99(1).
6 See CENTER FOR COMPARATIVE AND FOREIGN LAW STUDIES, UNILEX: INTERNATIONAL
CASE LAW & BMLIOGRAPHY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTs FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS B. I (1997) [hereinafter UNILEX]. See also, United Na-
tions Treaty Collection (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/>.
7 Under the CISG as formally executed in 1980, there are two distinct ways in which the
CISG can apply to a transaction: (a) if the parties have places of business in different states,
and the states are Contracting States under the Convention, or (b) if the parties have places
of business in different states, and conflicts-of-laws rules lead to the application of the law of
a Contracting State. CISG art. l(1). Certain states have excluded the second possibility by
express reservation, including the United States. See infra note 92, and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., HENRY GABRIEL, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 4
(1994) ("The Convention preempts the Uniform Commercial Code.") [hereinafter GABRIEL].
9 See JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG IN THE USA I (1995).
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The primary goal of the Convention was the unification of interna-
tional sales law. 0 The general goal of unification has been seen to enhance
certainty in international transactions, facilitate the continuing growth of
international trade with developing countries, help to adjust for differing
bargaining power among commercial actors, and advance a variety of other
worthy aims. 
1
It is still, however, uncertain as to whether the CISG Convention will
be successful in attaining its goals. To be sure, there are commentators who
have reveled in the number of its current signatories and its asserted
uniqueness as indicia of its perceived success.' However, there are also
indications that the Convention may not be headed for the desired degree of
acceptance and accomplishment. Commentary is far from uniformly posi-
tive on the Convention's present text.'3
Furthermore, although as noted above, the Convention at present has
51 states as Contracting Parties, several of the world's most significant
trading countries appear to evince skepticism and remain non-parties. Ex-
amples here would include the United Kingdom14, Japan, 5 and all of the
OPEC member countries except Iraq.'
6
Most significantly, within individual countries there are indications
that the CISG Convention may not be gaining the acceptance of commercial
1o See C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL, COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW:
THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 3 (1987) [hereinafter BIANCA & BONELL].
1 See id.
12 See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation
Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L L., 1, 3, 6-9 (1996);
Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, 8 PACE INT'L L. REv. 237, 238, 257-58 (1996).
13 Among those expressing doubts have been: Richard E. Speidel, Revision of UCC Arti-
cle 2 in Light of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 165 (1995) (suggesting that the CISG should generally not
be a model for the revision of Article 2); Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 45 Ono ST. L. J. 265
(1984) (arguing against ratification of the CISG prior to the vote by the U.S. Senate); and
John E. Murray, Jr., The Neglect of CISG: A Workable Solution, 17 J.L. & COM. 365 (1998)
(suggesting, inter alia, that a safe course for practitioners may be to avoid application of the
CISG).
14 For one scholar's explication of the United Kingdom's failure to accept the Conven-
tion, see Angelo Forte, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Reason and Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 BALT. L. REV. 51 (1997).
15 Indeed, although China is a party to the Convention, see UNILEX B.1, as well as
Singapore, the other states of Southeast Asia known for international commercial activity
and influence are all non-parties, including the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. See id.
16 See, e.g., THE STATESMAN'S YEARBOOK 62-63 (Brian Hunter ed., 1997-98) (listing the
eleven current OPEC-member states: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela); see also UNILEX, supra
note 6, B.1.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:1 (1998)
actors themselves. One of the most critical features of the Convention is
the opportunity it provides to parties entering into sales contracts to "opt
out" of the Convention by agreement. 7 This opt-out capability provides
commercial actors, of course, with the option of avoiding the Convention's
terms if they would rather be subject to otherwise applicable domestic law.
Accordingly, the potential for the subversion of the Convention's purposes
would emerge, at least to some extent, should large numbers of commercial
actors, either internationally or in particular countries opt out of the Con-
vention.
With the Convention having entered into force slightly over eleven
years ago, it may be too early to determine whether commercial actors
around the world, as a general practice, will accept its application or not.
However, there do seem to be clear trends developing in some respects. In
particular, the rates of application of the Convention in the courts and tribu-
nals of record have varied widely from one country to the next. For exam-
ple, in Germany there have been over 150 recorded cases involving the
CISG since its entry into force, 18 but in most countries party to the Conven-
tion the number is much lower.1 9 In the United States, of all the cases de-
cided in both federal and state courts since the Convention's entry into
force, only six opinions have contained serious substantive discussion of the
CISG,20 and only one of those cases (accounting for two of the opinions,
one at the trial level and the other at the appellate level) reached a decision
on the merits based on the terms of the Convention.2'
Even taking into account the possibility that the number of reported
cases in a jurisdiction may not be a complete indicator of the extent to
which the Convention is being applied there, discrepancies such as this
17 CISG art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or,
... derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.").
18 See MICHAEL R. WILL, CISG - THE FIRST 444 OR SO DEcIsioNs 1988-1997 13 (6th ed.
1998).
9 See id.
20 See MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d'Agostino S.p.A., 144 F.3d
1384 (1 1th Cir. 1998); Delchi Carrier, S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995); Mitchell Aircraft
Spares, Inc. v. European Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. I11. 1998); Claudia v.
Olivieri Footwear Ltd., 1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chile-
wich Int'l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The Filanto district court decision
was appealed, but the appellate opinion was decided on other grounds and made no reference
to the CISG. See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993). For
additional comment on these cases, as well as some others, see infra note 266.
21 See Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). For critical commentary
that considers the district court's application of the Convention to be "cursory" see Joanne
M. Darkey, A U.S. Court's Interpretation of Damage Provisions under the UN Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: A Preliminary Step towards an Interna-
tional Jurisprudence of CISG or a Missed Opportunity, 15 J. L. & COM. 139, 151 (1995).
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seem potentially significant. Especially in the United States, which is a
significant importer and exporter of goods,22 one might well expect that af-
ter eleven years of effectiveness, more than one court in all of the states and
throughout the entire federal system might have applied the substantive
terms of the Convention.
Of course, it is possible in such cases that the commercial parties and
the courts are simply unaware of the Convention's existence. However,
with every passing month this explanation seems less plausible. The CISG
Convention is one of the most talked-about, and written-about, aspects of
international commercial law.23 The possibility thus arises that as time pro-
gresses, it may become evident that significant numbers of commercial ac-
tors and significant numbers of courts and other adjudicatory bodies are
simply choosing not to apply the Convention. In such event, the question as
to why there should be such a reluctance to adopt the Convention will pres-
ent itself.
This Article finds helpful perspective on this question in the work of
international legal scholar Thomas Franck. Specifically, guidance is drawn
from the theory of international legitimacy developed in Professor Franck's
1990 book, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations,24 and in his earlier
Article, Legitimacy in the International System. 5 Under Franck's theory of
legitimacy, each rule of international law exerts a greater or lesser "pull to
compliance" to the extent the rule is characterized by greater or lesser le-
gitimacy. Legitimacy itself is analyzed in terms of four factors: determi-
nacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence.
This theory of legitimacy applies not only for states in the international
community, but also for other international actors. This Article asserts that
one reason the CISG may not experience more complete success is that the
' According to currently available data for 1997, United States persons exported goods
and services valued at over U.S. $931 billion, and imported goods and services valued at
over U.S. $1,045 billion. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINESs
D-51 78 (April 1998). Similarly, in 1997, the United States' share of world exports of goods
and services was 13.7%. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, WORLD EcoNOMIC
OUTLOOK 133, Table A (May 1998). Furthermore, according to the World Trade Organiza-
tion, total United States exports for 1997 amounted to $688.9 billion (f.o.b.), and total United
States imports for that year amounted to $899.2 billion (c.i.f.). World Trade Organization,
World Trade Growth Accelerated in 1997, Despite Turmoil in Some Asian Financial Mar-
kets, appendicies 1 & 2 (March 19, 1998) (last visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http:/lwww.wto.orglwto/intltradlintemat.htm>. These totals represented 12.6% and 16.2%
of world exports and imports, respectively. Id.
23 The CISG Convention has generated voluminous quantities of commentary and other
secondary materials. One helpful catalog of the available information is Claire M. Germain,
CISG: Guide to Research and Literature, 24 INT'L J. LEG. INF. 48 (1996).24 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) [hereinafter
FRANCK].
2 5 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705
(1988) [hereinafter FRANCK AJIL].
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:1 (1998)
Convention is, in the sense of Professor Franck's theory, substantially ille-
gitimate.
In so doing, this Article compares the CISG Convention with certain
other international laws and rules governing other types of business trans-
actions.26 It will show that every one of these other laws and rules has been
more successful than the CISG. This Article then illustrates that these laws
and rules have significantly more legitimacy, in Professor Franck's sense,
than the CISG. While it cannot at this stage be proven that the greater le-
gitimacy of these international legal rules is the cause of their greater suc-
cess, the inference is sufficiently strong to warrant serious interest.
Accordingly, the Article concludes that, in order for the CISG Con-
vention to achieve its maximum range of success, certain adjustments in the
manner in which it will be enforced and applied may be appropriate to in-
crease international legitimacy.
II. REVIEW OF MAJOR POINTs REGARDING THE CISG CONVENTION
This Article now reviews certain major points regarding the CISG
Convention. The intent is not to provide a comprehensive overview of the
Convention in general.27 Instead, the intent of the following review is to re-
familiarize the reader with certain basic elements of the Convention, em-
phasizing pertinent aspects that will be instrumental to the analysis in the
later portions of the Article.
A. Precwsors to the CISG Convention
The current CISG Convention is the product of a series of earlier ef-
forts. In 1929, at the suggestion of the German legal scholar Ernst Rabel,
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
began preparatory work to develop a uniform law on international sales.28
The UNIDROIT effort enlisted a prominent group of European scholars to
prepare a series of preliminary drafts, several of which were (after a suspen-
sion of work during World War II) completed in 1956, 1963 and 1958.29
26 See INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE
FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (International Chamber of Commerce Pub. No. 500, 1993); In-
ternational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading, 2
BEVANS 430, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 (Aug. 25, 1924); Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, 2 Bevans 983, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (Oct.
29, 1934).
27 The HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, provides an excellent review of the background
for the Convention and a commentary on its provisions. Helpful commentary are also pro-
vided by BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 10, and GABRIEL, supra note 8, who provides an ex-
press section-by-section concordance with Article 2 of the UCC.
2 8 See BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 10, at 3.
29 See HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 49-50.
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An international conference at The Hague was called in 1964 to act on
these drafts, and the conference ultimately completed two documents: the
Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods'O and the Uniform Law on
the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 3' Both of
these multilateral treaties became effective in 1972,32 but when any state
becomes a Contracting Party under the CISG, the state is required to de-
nounce either of the 1964 conventions to which it may be party.!
3
These 1964 sales conventions have never been very successful in es-
tablishing a working law of international sales. 34  The conventions -
sometimes called the "1964 Hague Conventions" - were negotiated, pre-
pared and drafted to reflect primarily Western European legal traditions.35
Their texts did not sufficiently reflect the background and perspective of le-
gal and commercial experience and traditions from other regions of the
world. Accordingly, the 1964 sales conventions never gained wide support
in the international community and have attracted a very small number of
signatories.
The potential inadequacy of the 1964 Hague Conventions was appar-
ently evident as early as 1968, because it was in that year that they attracted
the attention of the UN Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL"). 36 Two years earlier, the UN General Assembly had cre-
ated this Commission, and provided it with the mission of encouraging "the
progressive harmonization and unification of the law of international
trade. ' 37 As one of its first projects, UNCITRAL turned to the possible re-
vision of the 1964 Hague Conventions.3 s
UNCITRAL's charter provides for a membership of 36 states, and re-
quires that the identity of the members be allocated among the various re-
30 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, 834
U.N.T.S. 107 (July 1, 1964).
31 Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods, 834 U.N.T.S. 169 (July 1, 1964); see generally Elizabeth Hayes Patter-
son, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods:
Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination, 22 STAN. J. INT'L L.
263, 266-67 (1986); HoNNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 50.
32
"HoNNoLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 50.33 The CISG Convention generally requires such denunciation upon ratification, accep-
tance, approval or accession by a new state to the CISG Convention. CISG art. 99(3)-(6).34 See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 9, at 2; Bell, supra note 12, at 241; HONNOLD TREATISE,
supra note 3, at 50.
35 See Patterson, supra note 31, at 267; HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 53-54.
36 HoNNoLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 53.
37 G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., § I (1966), reprinted at I UNCITRAL Year-
book 65 (1968), at 65; HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 50.
38 See Patterson, supra note 31, at 268-70; HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 53.
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gions of the world according to a formula provided in its charter.39 This
formula results in a combined representation of Western Europe, Canada
and the United States amounting to slightly less than 25% of the total mem-
bership. It accomplishes its work largely through the efforts of "Working
Groups," which are said to be fielded princi ally from universities and gov-
ernment ministries in its member countries.
UNCITRAL decided relatively quickly that the best course would be to
totally revise the texts of the 1964 Hague Conventions, producing entirely
new documentation. This was seen as preferable to merely amending the
earlier texts.41 Since UNCITRAL has geographically a more broadly dis-
persed make-up than the bodies that drafted the 1964 Hague Conventions,
the same kind of parochialism was not an issue. UNCITRAL established a
Working Group to undertake the new sales law project.
42
The Working Group initially proceeded along the lines of preparing
two distinct documents, following the model of the 1964 conventions. Ul-
timately, however, both sets of rules - one regarding substantive sales law
and the other the law of sales contract formation - were combined into a
single new convention.43 UNCITRAL's work on the project was laborious
and encompassed many years. A convention under United Nations auspices
was finally called in Vienna in the spring of 1980 to review and revise the
UNCITRAL draft.44 The draft as so reviewed and revised was unanimously
approved by the conferring states, and the CISG was thus completed and
signed on April 11, 1980. It is sometimes also referred to as the "Vienna
Convention on International Sales."
B. The Completed Convention and the NIEO Movement
The completed CISG Convention is an omnibus document consisting
of 101 articles of text, covering nearly all of the major issues that custom-
arily arise in the negotiation, formation and performance of sales contracts.
Different sub-parts of the Convention are devoted to the requirements for a
valid offer,45 requirements for an effective acceptance, 46 what constitutes an
actionable breach,47 requirements for effective delivery a remedies for
39 G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., § II, 1 (1966), reprinted at 1 UNCITRAL
Yearbook 65 (1968), at 65-66; G.A. Res. 3108, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., 8 (1973), re-
printed at 5 UNCITRAL Yearbook 11 (1974); HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 51 & n.7.
40 See HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 51, 53.
41 See HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 54.
42 See Patterson, supra note 31, at 271-72; HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 54.
43 See Patterson, supra note 31, at 272 & n.38.
44 See DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 4, at 3; HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at
54-55.45 CISG art. 14.
46 CISG art. 18.
4 7 See, e.g., CISG art. 25.
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breach,49 and so on. It is drafted in detailed and technical terms, yet retains
in most instances relative clarity. Certain issues are excluded from its cov-
erage, such as questions regarding the validity of the contract and seller's
liability for death or personal injury caused by the goods.50
The entire Convention was designed chiefly, of course, to further "the
development of international trade on the basis of equality and mutual bene-
fit,"5' but at the time of its adoption the Convention was not alone in at-
tempting to reach such goals. Coinciding with the completion of the
Convention in 1980 was the ascendancy of an international political en-
deavor then referred to as the "New International Economic Order" move-
ment (sometimes called the "NIEO").
The NIEO was an intellectual movement of the 1970's and early
1980,s52 that addressed itself broadly to a wide variety of issues concerning
the developing countries of the world. Numerous scholars and commenta-
tors, working chiefly in the areas of economics and political science and
related disciplines,51roduced substantial scholarly work in connection with
the NIEO theories. The NIEO movement received the official support of
the United Nations General Assembly when that body passed a set of reso-
lutions endorsing the NIEO in May of 1974.54
The precise goals and objectives of the NIEO movement tended to vary
at least somewhat from one commentator or activist to the next.ss However,
41 CISG arts. 30-44.
49 CISG arts. 45-52, 61-65.
5o CISG arts. 4, 5.
a1 CISG, Preamble (second para.).
52 It is possible to view the development of the "NIEO ideology" as a "response" to the
problems of less developed countries stemming from as early as the adoption of the Bretton
Woods system in the late 1940's. See, e.g., CRAIG MURPHY, THE EMERGENCE OF THE NIEO
IDEOLOGY 3 (1984). However, the movement seems to have reached its peak in the years
from 1974 to about 1982.
53 Among the many scholarly contributions are MURPHY, supra note 52, as well as
JEFFREY A. HART, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1983); EDwIN P. REUBENS,
THE CHALLENGE OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (Edwin P. Reubens ed.
1981); and P. N. AGARWALA, THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: AN OVERVIEw
(1983).
"4 DECLARATION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
RESOLUTION 3201 (S-IV) (May 1, 1974), reprinted in 28 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
324 (1974) [hereinafter UN ESTABLISHMENT REsOLUTION]; PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, RESOLUTION 3202 (S-VI)
(May 1, 1974), reprinted in 28 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 326 (1974) [hereinafter
UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION RESOLUTION].
55 For example, according to Craig Murphy, the five NIEO principles at the time of his
writing were: (1) the need for international management of the global economy, (2) the eco-
nomic rights and duties of states, (3) the equality of individual states, (4) the moral obliga-
tion of past and present exploiters to negotiate the reform of existing international economic
systems, and (5) the duty of current exploiter states to compensate their victims. MURPHY,
supra note 52, at 158. On the other hand, Jeffrey Hart discerned eight main issues for devel-
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most NIEO commentaries seemed to include as a major element the need to
make major changes in the international economic system. 6
The CISG places substantial importance on the NIEO movement by
explicitly referring to the "New International Economic Order" in the Con-
vention's preamble.5 7 Furthermore, a high-water mark of the NIEO was a
broadly-disseminated and quite influential report entitled North-South: A
Program for Survival,58 which was also published in 1980. The North-
South report was issued by an independently organized commission of
scholars, politicians and other prominent public figures,59 and could be
called a manifesto of sorts for the NIEO movement. Because this report
was more broadly disseminated, and intended for a wider audience, than
most of the academic or ministerial NIEO tracts, it might be thought to be
one of the most influential of the NIEO movement documents.
The North-South report and the NIEO in general saw the world as be-
ing largely, if imperfectly, divisible into two economic regions: the
"North," composed of countries that were "rich" and "developed," and the
oping countries in the NIEO negotiations: (1) sovereignty over their economies and natural
resources, (2) increasing their control over the level and nature of foreign investment,
(3) maintaining or (preferably) increasing the purchasing power of raw material and com-
modity exports, (4) increasing access to commercial markets of developed countries,
(5) reducing the cost of technology transfers, (6) increasing the flow of official development
assistance, (7) alleviating the debt burdens of certain developing countries, and
(8) increasing the decision-making power of the developing world in the United Nations and
the IMF/World Bank system. HART, supra note 53, at 33.5 6 See, e.g., Edwin P. Reubens, An Overview of the NIEO, in THE CHALLENGE OF THE
NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 53, at 1 (the UN NIEO declarations said
to "call for the reconstruction of the existing economic system in the areas of trade, finance,
technological transfers and national sovereignty"); AGARWALA, supra note 53, at 18 ("A new
economic order must be founded on arrangements providing for genuine equality of oppor-
tunity and rewards between states ...
57 CISG, Preamble (first para.).
58 See INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES, NORTH-
SOUTH: A PROGRAM FOR SURVIVAL (1980) [hereinafter NORTH-SOUTH].
59 The Commission was sometimes referred to as the "Brandt Commission" because
Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of what was then West Germany, was its chairman.
Reubens, supra note 56, at 5. Among its 20 other members were Olaf Palme, former Prime
Minister of Sweden; Joe Morris, a Canadian labor leader and former Chairman of the Inter-
national Labor Organization Goveming Body; Katharine Graham, Chairman of the Wash-
ington Post Co.; and academics and ministerial figures from numerous developing countries.
Id.
60 There were other voices in the NIEO debate apart from the Independent Commission.
Some felt that the NIEO proposals, by themselves, did not go far enough in helping those
countries most in need, and a "Basic Needs" approach was advanced instead of, or along-
side, NIEO. See Johan Galtung, The New International Economic Order and the Basic
Needs Approach, in THE NORTH/SoUTH DEBATE: TECHNOLOGY, BASIC HUMAN NEEDS AND
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1980).
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"South," composed of countries that were "poor" and "developing., 61 The
prime focus of attention was then this "fundamental inequality of economic
strength. 62  The NIEO activists asserted that the world economy was
"functioning so badly that it damages [the] interests of all nations," 63 and
that "prospects for the future are alarming." 64 The North-South report set
forth a detailed program designed to redress the power imbalance between
rich and poor countries, including such matters as the abolition of hunger,
the stabilization of world commodity prices, the reduction of protectionist
tariffs imposed by countries of the North, improvements in the extraction
practices regarding mineral resources in developing countries, reform of the
international monetary system, and major new financial commitments to
development in poor countries in general. 65 Implicit in many of these rec-
ommendations was the frequently acknowledged need for a "large scale
61 See NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 58, at 31; see also MURPHY, supra note 52, at 127-37
(conceptualizing the discussions about NIEO as the "north-south dialogue").62 See NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 58, at 32. See also AGARWALA, supra note 53, at 12
("What is at issue is the blind determination with which policies inherited'from a colonial
economic context, and perpetuating unjust and untenable inequities are affirmed as immuta-
ble principles of law."); Reubens, supra note 56, at 1 (characterizing the UN NIEO resolu-
tions as being geared toward "narrowing disparities between the more developed countries
and the LDCs ['less developed countries']').63 See NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 58, at 267.
6See id. at 269.65 See NORTH-SoUTH, supra note 58, at 271-73. Regarding commodity prices, see also
MURPHY, supra note 52, at 160 (advocating "[v]arious actions designed to keep commodity
prices high"); UN ESTABiSHMENT RESOLUTION, supra note 54, at 40) (endorsing a "just
and equitable relationship between the prices of... goods exported by developing countries
and the prices of... goods and equipment imported by them"). Regarding protectionist tar-
iffs, see also MURPHY, supra note 52, at 160 ("tariff preferences [should] continue to be
granted to the developing states"); AGARWALA, supra note 53, at 24 ("in recent years, pro-
tectionist trends have been increasing"). Regarding natural resources, see also HART, supra
note 53, at 33 (advocating for developing countries the maintenance of their "sovereignty
over their economic and natural resources"); UN PROGRAMME OF ACTION RESOLUTION, su-
pra note 54, at 1.1(a) ("All efforts should be made: [t]o put an end to all forms of foreign
... exploitation through exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources."). Re-
garding the international monetary system, see id. at 11.1(e) ("All efforts should be made to
reform the international monetary system with [a]dequate and orderly creation of additional
liquidity with particular regard to the needs of the developing countries").
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transfer of resources ' 66 from the rich northern countries to the poorer south-
em countries.67
One of the features of the NIEO movement was the assertion that rich
northern countries generally have more bargaining power in negotiating in-
ternational transactions than poor southern countries.68 Sometimes this dif-
ference in bargaining power was expressed in terms of a perceived general
unfairness stemming from the greater power and status of the North,69 and
sometimes it was related to particular situations in specific industries, such
as mineral extraction 7 and the sale of agricultural commodities 71.
Most of the attention of the NIEO activists was focused on chiefly
economic and fiscal issues, such as world hunger and poverty, energy, trade
in commodities, international monetary structures and developmental fi-
nancing. The major focus of the NIEO activists was accordingly in these
practical spheres rather than explicitly with law. However, in 1978, in re-
sponse to a request from the UN General Assembly, UNCITRAL asked the
UN Secretary-General to prepare a report on the New International Eco-
nomic Order,72 detailing possible actions that UNCITRAL could take in the
context of the NIEO movement. The Secretary-General's report described
numerous actions taken by UN bodies and individual governments that
could be seen as furthering the goals of the NIEO. The Secretary-General
66 See, e.g., NORTH-SouTH, supra note 58, at 36 (advocating "a large-scale transfer of re-
sources"), and at 67 (referencing "'massive transfers' of funds from North to South"); see
also Reubens, supra note 56, at I 1 ("[T]he NIEO calls upon MDCs ['more developed coun-
tries'] for enlarged transfers of capital and technology to LDCs ['less developed countries']
on easier terms"); UN ESTABLISHMENT RESOLUTION, supra note 54, at I 4(k) (advocating
"[e]xtension of active assistance to developing countries by the world international commu-
nity"); MURPHY, supra note 52, at 158 (identifying, as noted in note 55 supra, as a NIEO
principle, "the duty of current exploiter states to compensate their victims").
67 For an interesting explanation of why the NIEO movement ultimately fell short of its
goals, see P. Bukman, Opening Address: Development Policy in Retrospect and Prospect, in
NORTH-SOUTH: Co-OPERATION IN RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT 26-27 (C.J. Jepma ed., 1988).
68 E.g., NORTH-SOuTH, supra note 58, at 42 (describing the need and desire of the South
for "the ability to bargain on more equal terms with the richer countries").
69 See NORTH-SOuTH, supra note 58, at 65 ("We are looking for a world based less on
power and status, more on justice and contract; less discretionary, more governed by fair and
open rules."); see also AGARWALA, supra note 53, at 35 ("The position of the developing
countries in the technology market is ... weak .... It is almost impossible for them to deal
on equal terms with TNCs ['transnational corporations'] and international credit institu-
tions.").
70 See NORTH-SOUTH, supra note 58, at 85 (regarding exploitation of mineral resources,
"the poorer countries with their weak bargaining power and lack of information about their
own resources, are often reluctant to enter into contracts with transnationals.").
71 See id. at 144 ("In the case of many commodities the immediate issue is not that of se-
curing more competitive markets, but action to provide balanced bargaining power.").
72 See New International Economic Order, Report of the Secretary-General, 31st Sess., in
1-3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/171 (1979), reprinted in 10 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 113 (1979)
[hereinafter SECRETARY-GENERAL NIEO REPORT].
CISG Convention and Thomas Franck's Theory of Legitimacy
19:1 (1998)
reviewed the status of the CISG Convention in some detail, noting its goals
of harmonizing and unifying international trade law, and presented his dis-
cussion in a manner indicating the view that the CISG Convention was con-
sonant with the NIEO movement.73
It would be an overstatement to say that the CISG Convention was
purely, or even principally, an outgrowth of the NIEO movement, and cer-
tainly advocacy for the CISG in 1980 would not necessarily have implied
partisanship for the NIEO. Indeed, in the United States, Senate ratification
of the CISG admittedly was urged by then-President Ronald Reagan, 74 no
doubt not the most ardent supporter of some of the more radical elements of
the NIEO. However, the major themes of equalizing bargaining power and
providing fair terms of transactions and negotiations were common to both
endeavors. Both projects took place in a legal and policy environment em-
phasizing the need to redesign key structures in international economic re-
lationships, and a policy nexus between the two seems to have been readily
apparent, including within the organs of the United Nations and in the text
of the CISG itself.
The Convention's connection with the NIEO movement will later be
addressed regarding one of the factors of legitimacy discerned by Thomas
Franck, "symbolic validation."75
C. Issues of Interpretation
A major focus of the CISG Convention is, as noted above, the promo-
tion of international uniformity. Accordingly, one of the most significant
provisions of its introductory "General Provisions" chapter admonishes as
follows: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tin ,,76tion .... ,7
A significant number of commentators has attached major importance
to this provision, and asserted an overriding need for courts and other dis-
pute resolution bodies to decide issues under the Convention in a manner
that promotes international uniformity.77 However, the Convention estab-
73 See SEcRErARY-GENERALNIEO REPORT, supra note 72, at 116 23-28.74 See Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting The United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, adopted by a United Nations
Conference of Sixty-Two States on April l1, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983), reprinted in THE CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: A
HANDBOOK OF BASIC MATERIALS 74-96 (Daniel Barstow Magraw & Reed R. Kathrein eds.,
2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Message from the President].
7S See infra Part V.B. (discussing "symbolic validation" in the context of the CISG Con-
vention).76 CISG art. 7(1).
77 Among the many commentators expressing views along these lines are Phanesh Kon-
eru, The International Interpretation of the UN Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: An Approach Based on General Principles, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
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lishes no supra-national body for its interpretation or the resolution of dis-
putes under it.78 Furthermore, of course, no such supra-national body oth-
erwise exists. Accordingly, the CISG's exhortation to uniformity seems to
require the courts and other fora in each country to be attentive to the inter-
pretations, analyses and holdings in other countries. 79 The Convention's di-
rective would seem to imply that, in the interests of uniformity,
adjudicatory bodies in a particular state should give relevant precedents in
foreign jurisdictions at least equal weight against any municipal precedents
or doctrines that might differ from the foreign decisions. It has been ar-
gued, indeed, that in some cases, conceivably, the foreign cases might even
be asserted to take precedence over municipal authority.
This approach is, to say the least, problematic. Firstly, the CISG Con-
vention was executed in six official languages, and the Convention states
that each of these six different texts is equally authentic. 80 A court or other
dispute resolution body working in one language may naturally experience
difficulty in interpreting and applying precedents decided in another. A
certain level of error in such cases is all but inevitable. Furthermore, not
only do languages vary from one state to the next, but legal cultures and ju-
dicial systems vary as well. It can be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to transfer jurisprudential terms and concepts used in managing and re-
solving disputes from one kind of adjudicatory system to the next.
The Convention, at various points, recognizes the need for parties and
courts to refer to municipal laws in interpreting and applying its terms.
Perhaps most significantly, the Convention acknowledges that parties and
courts may need to refer to municipal law in some cases in which there is a
gap in the Convention's literal language:
"Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such princi-
ples, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of private interna-
tional law."'
Even here, however, as the commentary has noted, the Convention
clearly considers resort to municipal law as a relatively disfavored, second-
best approach. The first preference is for the obviously elusive "general
105 (1997); V. Suzanne Cook, The Need for Uniform Interpretation of the 1980 United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 197
(1988); Amy Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Na-
tions Sales Convention, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 574 (1988).
78 See Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Practice under the Convention on Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG): A Primer for Attorneys and International Traders, 27 UCC L.
J. 331, 334 (1995).
79 Sometimes commentators are quite explicit on the need for courts to be guided by for-
eign jurisdictions. See Koneru, supra note 77, at 108, and Cook, supra note 77, at 198.80 CISG, Testimonium clause.
"I CISG art. 7(2).
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principles on which [the Convention] is based." This arrangement further
emphasizes the desires of the drafters for uniform interpretation, problem-
atic though such a goal may prove to be.
These interpretive issues will be material in the later discussion of le-
gitimacy factors pertaining to "determinacy" and "coherence," and their re-
lation to the CISG Convention.82
D. Self-Executing Character and Requirements for Amendment
At least since ratification of the CISG by the Senate, the CISG has
been considered self-executing within the United States. 3 Accordingly, the
Convention became effective as a part of the federal law of the United
States without Congressional passage of any statute explicitly incorporating
it into the federal statute books.84
In addition, it seems relatively clear that the Convention cannot be
amended in a way that binds all parties to it, except by express consent of
85all parties. Of course, in most cases one or more states can probably
amend the Convention so that such amendment takes place only among
themselves, 86 but such arrangement would presumably not advance the uni-
formity of application that is the Convention's chief purpose.
Similarly, the CISG specifically prohibits states from taking any reser-
vations except those which are expressly authorized in the Convention's
text.87  Generally, international law permits states to make reservations
when signing or ratifying a treaty, unless the reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty, or the treaty otherwise provides.88
The CISG, however, only allows five types of reservations: (1) a reserva-
tion to the effect that the Contracting State will not be bound either by the
Convention's provisions on contract formation, or in the alternative, by the
12 See Parts V.A.1. and V.C., infra (respectively analyzing the applicability of these fac-
tors to the CISG Convention).
83 Messagefrom the President, supra note 74, at 77 (containing a letter of submittal dated
August 30, 1983 from Secretary of State George Schultz to President Reagan stating that
"[t]he Convention... is self-executing and thus requires no federal implementing legislation
to come into force throughout the United States").
8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111(3) (1987) (declaring the binding effect of international agreements of the U.S. on U.S.
courts, except for non-self-executing agreements).
8'5 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Arts. 39-41, 63 A.J.I.L.
875, 887-88 (1969), 8 I.L.M. 679, 694-95 (1969).86 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 85, art. 41, 63 A.J.I.L. at
888; 8 I.L.M. at 695.
87 CISG art. 98 ("No reservations are permitted except those expressly authorized in this
Convention.").
88 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 85, art. 19, 63 A.J.I.L. at
881, 8 I.L.M. at 686-87.
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Convention's provisions on the sale of goods;8 9 (2) a reservation to the ef-
fect that a Contracting State with two or more territorial units that have dif-
ferent systems of law may exclude the application of the Convention to one
or more such units;90 (3) a reservation to the effect that two or more Con-
tracting States with closely related legal rules on international sales law
may exclude the application of the Convention as between themselves; 91 (4)
a reservation to the effect that the Convention will only apply to contracts
involving a party whose place of business is in a Contracting State when the
other party also has its place of business in another Contracting State; -92 and
(5) a reservation to the effect that, notwithstanding the provision of the
Convention that effectively eliminates the Statute of Frauds doctrine,93 al-
lows a Contracting State to, in essence reinstate the requirement of a writing
for the effectiveness of the contract.
94
The self-executing character of the CISG Convention will be discussed
later in connection with the Convention's potential problems of "coher-
ence," and the difficulty of its amendment will be material to this Article's
ultimate analysis of the Convention's "determinacy.
95
E. The Capacity to "Opt Out" of the Convention
As indicated in the earlier introductory comments,96 one of the most
significant features of the CISG Convention is that it permits commercial
actors whose places of business are in Contracting States to "opt out" of the
Convention's applicability. In this way, commercial actors whose transac-
89 CISG art. 92. This arrangement has the effect of continuing the parallelism with the bi-
furcated structure inherent in the 1964 Hague Conventions, discussed in text supra at notes
30-38. Just as under the Hague Convention regime, a state could choose to become a party
either to the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
or the Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods; the Article 92 arrangement allows
states to choose between the CISG version of these two regimes as well, if they so wish.
90 CISG art. 93.
91 CISG art. 94. This was intended to benefit primarily the Scandinavian countries, and
they have indeed availed themselves of the provision. See UNILEX, supra note 6, B.2
(containing a list 6f Reservations and Declarations in which Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden take the Article 94 exception, and also except out Iceland, pursuant to paragraph (2)
of Article 94).
9 CISG art. 95. This reservation thus excludes the application of the Convention in those
situations under CISG Article l(1)(b) where, although the place of business of one party
might not be in a Contracting State, the Convention would otherwise be applicable under ap-
plicable conflicts-of-laws rules. Many states have taken this exception, including the United
States.
9' CISG art. 11. ("A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing
and is not subject to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, in-
cluding witnesses.").
94 CISG art. 96.
9' See infra Parts V.C. and V.A.2. (respectively analyzing these factors).
96 See supra text at note 17.
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tions would otherwise be covered by the Convention can escape its applica-
tion simply by agreeing between themselves that it will not apply. This ar-
rangement is expressed in Article 6 of the CISG Convention, which
provides in its entirety: "The parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to Article 12 , derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions."
Accordingly, the extent to which private parties are required to comply
with the CISG can be viewed as entirely voluntary. This arrangement is
similar to the situation said to pertain in international law, and discussed in
the next part of this Article, whereby the extent to which states in the inter-
national community comply with international law seems in certain respects
to be voluntary. It is true that the voluntary choice made by commercial
actors under the CISG Convention is the decision whether the body of rules
will apply in the first instance, whereas the assertion about the voluntary
behavior of states also addresses whether to obey the body of rules once
they are said to apply. However, this Article shows later that this apparent
distinction is immaterial for our purposes.
It is partly this capacity for private actors to avoid the Convention that
makes Thomas Franck's theories especially salient.98
III. THOMAS FRANCK'S THEORY OF LEGITIMACY
One of the classical problems of international law is the question of
whether it can be considered law at all. Skeptics have asserted that intema-
tional law is not really law, either because states in the international com-
munity routinely violate purported international law,99 or because a truly
sovereign state cannot be said to be subject to external command,'
00 or for
other similar reasons. 0 1
97 Article 12 of the CISG prohibits derogation by the parties to any sales contract from
any requirements imposed by a particular state for the sales contract to be in writing.
9' See infra Part III.E. (regarding the applicability of Professor Franck's legitimacy theo-
ries to private actors).
99 See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 24, at 6 (noting that "international laws are thought not
to be obeyed and the governance of international institutions and their norms not to be ac-
cepted," and finding fault with such perspectives); id. at 7 ("This, after all is international
law. Disobedience is thought - albeit wrongly - to be the prevalent practice .... ).
10 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 177 (1861)
("[T]he law obtaining between nations is not positive law: for every positive law is set by a
given sovereign to a person or persons in a state of subjection to its author"). But cf. J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 55 (1978) ("[S]tates are not persons, however convenient it
may often be to personify them .... Their subjection to law is as yet imperfect, though it is
real as far as it goes .... ).
101 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2d ed. 1993) ("Given
the rarity of effective formal international legislative and executive organs, some have said
quite simply that international law does not or cannot exist....").
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International law scholar Thomas Franck has gained significant promi-
nence for his treatment of this issue.102 He concedes that international law
is not law in the same dense as the law operating domestically within
states. 0 3 However, what strikes Professor Franck as remarkable is that in
view of the lack of coercive power behind most international law rules, so
many rules of international law are so frequently followed by so many
states.1 4 He determines that there must be something else that is responsi-
ble for the usual practice of states in obeying international law rules, since
such obedience can usually not be traced to coercive power over those
states.
102 Franck's theories of legitimacy have attracted substantial scholarly attention. See,
e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599,
2628-29, 2633, 2643 (1997) (in the context of a review of a later work by Prof. Franck, the
author revisits The Power ofLegitimacy Among Nations, and relates Franck's theories in that
work to "a revival of the Kantian philosophical tradition"); Robert O. Keohane, International
Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 487, 491-93 (1997) (dis-
cussing legitimacy as an aspect of the "normative optic" through which international law can
be viewed, and citing The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations and Legitimacy in the Inter-
national System as leading sources of legitimacy theory); A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness
of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as Illustrated by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1, 32, 37 (1995) (using Prof. Franck's legitimacy theories to evaluate the practical
reality of thejus cogens doctrine in a variety of contexts); Rachael E. Schwartz, "And To-
morrow?" - The Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 271, 317-29
(1994) (containing a detailed exposition of Prof. Franck's legitimacy theories and applying
them to the Torture Victim Protection Act); Sean D. Murphy, The Security Council, Legiti-
macy, and the Concept of Collective Security After the Cold War, 32 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 201, 249-51 (1994) (reviewing Prof. Franck's observations concerning the legitimacy of
particular aspects of the operations of the UN Security Council); Anthony Clark Arend, The
United Nations and the New World Order, 491 GEO. L. J. 491 (1993) (discussing Prof.
Franck's views of legitimacy in connection with new world power structures emerging after
the Cold War). Of special interest, see John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties:
A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J.
139, 162-73 (1996) (applying Prof. Franck's legitimacy theories to the law of treaties and
asserting limitations to its validity in that context); Michael Byers, Taking the Law Out of
International Law: A Critique of the "Iterative Perspective, " 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 201, 202-
03 (1997) (defending Prof. Franck and stating that Setear's criticism of Franck is "unsatis-
fying").
103 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 29 ("If international law were law like any other, there
would be nothing remarkable about states' conformity to legal mandates .... [I]ntemational
'law' is not like the laws with which citizens of states are familiar .... ).
1
0 4 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 3 ("Lacking support from a coercive power comparable
to that which provides backing for the laws of a nation, the rules of international community
nevertheless elicit much compliance on the part of sovereign states."); FRANCK AJIL, supra
note 25, at 705 ("The surprising thing about international law is that nations ever obey its
strictures ... 2).
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The factor responsible for this pattern of obedience is "legitimacy," as
defined by Professor Franck.10 5 To the extent a rule is legitimate, in Profes-
sor Franck's sense, it exerts a pull to compliance on those to whom it is ad-
dressed.'0 6 Legitimacy, and the "compliance pull" resulting from it, are not
absolute, but exist on a sliding scale. That is, some rules are more or less
legitimate than others to varying degrees, and thus accordingly exert vary-
ing degrees of "compliance pull., 1 ° 7 As his central thesis, Franck deter-
mines that the extent to which a rule has legitimacy, in his sense, depends
on the extent to which the rule possesses four distinct properties: determi-
nacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence.0 8
This Article ultimately turns to the CISG Convention, and discusses
the extent to which the Convention possesses these four characteristics. At
this point, however, this Article first describes each of these properties in
somewhat more detail, as developed in Professor Franck's theories.
A. Determinacy
"Determinacy," in Franck's sense, essentially refers to textual clar-
ity0'9 It could be called a "literary" property inhering in the content of the
rule's text." 0 The more determinate the rule, the more clearly expressed by
its text, the greater its pull to compliance and the greater its legitimacy."'
One example that Franck uses to illustrate this concept of determinacy
is a hypothetical involving a foreign ambassador's son who has murdered
someone in Washington, D.C., and has been apprehended by the local po-
lice. 1" 2 The United States Secretary of State demands the release of the
jailed assailant, declaring that he has diplomatic immunity and must be re-
patriated for trial in his home country. Suppose there is widespread outrage
and it is left to the State Department to explain to the public why, and how,
this diplomatic immunity is in fact required by international law. The Sec-
105 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 25 ("Why do nations obey rules?... Because they per-
ceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy.") (emphasis
omitted).
1's See id. at 16 ("[L]egitimacy ... could be formulated thus: a property... which itself
exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively.") (emphasis omitted). See
also FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 708 ("That some rules in themselves seem to exert
more pull to compliance than others is the starting point in the search for a theory of legiti-
macy.").
10 7 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 26 ("[S]ince the compliance pull of various rules and
institutions varies widely, it follows that ... legitimacy, too, must be a matter of degree.").
03 See id. at 49; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 712.
109 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 52 ("[D]eterminacy is more or less synonymous with
clarity."); FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 713 ("What is meant by this [textual determi-
nacy] is the ability of the text to convey a clear message .....
10 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 713.
.. See id. at 714.
"2 See id. at 716-17. FRANCK, supra note 24, at 57-59.
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retary of State will naturally say that the rule of diplomatic immunity pro-
tects United States nationals abroad as well as foreigners in this country,
and that on this basis - if no other - the rule should be respected here.
One factor determining the extent to which this will be persuasive,
however, will be the extent to which the purported rule can be shown to be
determinate. For example, if it can only be shown that diplomatic immu-
nity as usually applied in the world protects ambassadors themselves, rather
than their family members, the textual import of such a rule will be much
less clear, less determinate, and exert less of a compliance pull, in this
situation. All the more so if it can be shown that such immunity in the
world arena sometimes does not apply if a capital crime is involved, or is
applied only when the relative is an employee at the embassy. In sum, the
extent to which the rule is determinate depends on the clarity and precision
with which it is written or expressed.
Franck then develops the idea of determinacy further. Some situations
in the real world are susceptible to rules of unimpeachable clarity and preci-
sion that will be effective in dealing with the situations they address. For
example, a rule requiring a vehicle to stop if the light is red, and allowing it
to go forward if the light is green, can be effectively determinate in its total
clarity and precision. 3 These relatively straightforward situations, admit-
ting of extreme precision, could be called essentially "binary" situations
permitting essentially binary rules.'
14
Not all situations in the world arena are binary situations, however.
Indeed, many situations in international affairs are characterized by their
extreme complexity, rather than simplicity. In developing rules for these
situations, it will not be possible to come up with the same degree of clarity
and precision that can be supplied for binary situations. After all, the more
complicated a situation is, the greater the risk that rules dealing with it will
be subject to ambiguity and errors of interpretation, thereby sacrificing their
determinacy and - to that extent - their legitimacy.
This does not mean, however, that complicated situations can not ad-
mit of determinate rules. Rather, Professor Franck introduces the concept
of "process determinacy" to meet these situations."15 A rule has process
determinacy if ambiguities and other difficulties of interpretation and appli-
cation can be resolved in a forum or fora that bear the other indicia of le-
n' See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 84; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 722 (using the ex-
ample of "red light to port, green light to starboard").
114 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 722 ("A simple, straightforward rule... will
have a high level of determinacy if the problem to which it is addressed is widely recognized
as essentially binary. .. ").
115 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 85 (noting that for more complex rules, "determinacy
and legitimacy ... depend in significant part on whether there is a process for the rule's
case-by-case application which, itself, is widely accepted as legitimate").
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gitimacy 1 6 - symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. Such process
determinacy does not need to come from formal courts; any institution
"seen to be acting legitimately" may be used for this purpose.'7
However, as rules become increasingly more complex to address an
ever greater number of complex situations, it is crucial that there be avail-
able some process for resolving ambiguities in their application. In these
complex situations, without adequate process determinacy, the rules lack an
important measure of legitimacy and exert a correspondingly weakened pull
to compliance."1 ' Therefore, in Franck's view, a critical element for the le-
gitimacy of rules in complex factual situations is the degree to which such
rules are supported by process determinacy.
This Article will show that, due to the ways in which the CISG Con-
vention emphasizes uniformity in interpretation and application, it creates
significant problems in the area of process determinacy.1 9 In addition, the
relative difficulty of the Convention's amendment makes continued deter-
minacy in light of future developments more problematic.
1 20
B. Symbolic Validation
The property that Franck calls symbolic validation does not relate to
the text of the rule itself, and in that sense it differs from determinacy.
Rather, it pertains to the perceived authenticity of the rule as distinct from
its content."'
Symbolic validation, as perceived by Franck, exists primarily in two
forms: ritual and pedigree.1 22 Rituals, of course, are seen to be ceremonies,
often - but not always - mystical in nature, that provide unspoken basis
for compliance pull.12' Rules promulgated by a presidential administration
in the United States, for example, are all supported by the rituals involving
1
6 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 724 ("Issues that cannot be reduced to simple bi-
nary categories invite regulation by more complex rule texts which.., suffer the costs of
elasticity.... These costs, however, can be reduced by introducing a forum in which ambi-
guity can be resolved case by case.").
7 See id. at 725.
1"8 See id. (emphasizing the importance of "the availability of a process for resolving am-
biguities"); FRANCK, supra note 24, at 171 (referring to a particular hypothetical complex
fact pattern, "[w]ithout such process determinacy, the rule would lack serious pull to compli-
ance").
1 See infra Part V.A. I. (addressing "process determinacy" in the context of the CISG
Convention).
'20 See infra Part V.A.2. (addressing the impact of the difficulty of amending the CISG
Convention on continued determinacy).
121 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 91 ("In this instance,... what is to be communicated is
not so much the content as validity or authenticity. . . .") (emphasis in original).
122 See id. at 91-94; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 725-26.
12 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 92; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 726.
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the oath of office sworn by the President every four years. 124 This Article
will not adopt this idea of ritual as a major focus.
The notion of pedigree, on the other hand, will be taken to be quite
material. Franck's concept of pedigree is said to pull to compliance by
"empjhasizing the deep rootedness of the rule or the rule-making author-
ity.''125 The focus here can be on literal pedigree, such as the lineage of per-
sons involved, 26 or it can be a more metaphorical pedigree, involving more
general historical origins, or cultural or anthropological background. 127 In
more general terms, it could be said that pedigree inheres whenever a per-
son or institution, by virtue of who or what the person or institution is, or
the position occupied by the person or institution, "deserves to be obeyed"
or "to be taken seriously.',
128
From the arena of international politics, Franck offers the example of
the practice of state recognition as illustrating the importance of pedigree. 29
When a newly formed state enters into a bilateral treaty, for example, the
legitimacy of the rules thus engendered is much enhanced if the new state
has been recognized as a state by a significant number of influential states
in the world community. Such legitimacy would also be enhanced if the
new state had been admitted to the United Nations. In Franck's sense, these
acts of recognition and admission testify to the new state's pedigree.
130
Another example Franck offers for the concept of pedigree draws on an
observation by Professor Oscar Schachter:
Professor Schachter has observed that a body of rules produced by
the UN legislative drafting body, the International Law Commission
[ILC], will be more readily accepted by the nations 'after [the ILC] has
devoted a long period in careful study and consideration of precedent
and practice.' Moreover, the authority will be greater if the product is
labeled codification - that is, the interpolation of rules from deep-
rooted evidence of state practice - 'than if it were presented as a "de-
velopment" (that is, as new law)' .... 131
124 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 94 ("The oath to uphold the federal Constitution of the
United States, in a sense, may be seen as America's ultimate secular ritual ...
125 d
126 See id. at 95 (referencing the generally stabilizing influence said by some to inhere in
hereditary office) (quoting Maurice Cranston, From Legitimism to Legitimacy, in
LEG1TIMACY/LtGIT1M1Tt 37 (A. Moulakis ed., 1986)).
127 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 726.
128 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 95 ("A person is said to deserve to be obeyod [sic] - or,
in modem usage, to be 'taken seriously' because of his or her lineage.").
129 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 726 ("An example [of pedigree] is the practice of
'recognition'. When a government recognizes a new regime, or when the United Nations
admits a new state to membership, this partly symbolic act has broad significance.").
130 Franck also offers the sometimes detailed process of diplomatic accreditation as an-
other example of his idea of pedigree. See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 105.
131 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 726 (quoting Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of
International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300, 310 (1968)) (emphasis in original).
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This example shows that the lineage, or pedigree, of rules promulgated
by organizations such as the ILC can depend at least in part on the circum-
stances of their promulgation - the degree to which the rules were exam-
ined by the organization - as well as to perceived content elements of the
rules, such as whether they are codification or development.
This Article demonstrates that, due to certain characteristics of the
groups responsible for the design and preparation of the CISG Convention,
other circumstances contemporaneous with its completion, and certain as-
pects of its substantive treatment of some questions, there are substantial
pedigree issues impairing its voluntary adoption by private parties.1
C. Coherence
For Franck, determinacy and symbolic validation alone are not suffi-
cient to establish the legitimacy of a rule. Even if a rule is textually deter-
minate and supported by appropriate symbolic validation, it will still lack a
measure of legitimacy if the rule is so at odds with other applicable rules as
to establish cognitive dissonance in the audience to which it is addressed.
133
In other words, the given rule must be seen as being in a certain kind of
harmony with the network of related previously existing rules of which it is
apart.
Referring to this property as "coherence," Franck draws on the work of
Ronald Dworkin for a definition: "a rule is coherent when like cases are
treated alike in application of the rule and when the rule relates in a princi-
pled fashion to other rules of the same system.' 34 This element of coher-
ence is similar to the idea of consistency, but Franck perceives a distinction
between coherence and consistency. Consistency refers to the treatment of
two or more subjects in the same way, whereas coherence admits of differ-
ing treatment of the various subjects as long as the differing treatment is
connected to "some rational principle of broader application."
One of the primary examples used in this connection involves a hypo-
thetical repayment scheme for past due sovereign debt. 36 Franck posits a
multilateral agreement between debtor nations and creditor nations, pursu-
ant to which exactly one-half of the outstanding debt is to be repaid and
one-half forgiven. One possibility would be allowing complete forgiveness
for the debts of those states whose names began with the letters A-M, while
112 See infra Part V.B. (regarding Franck's idea of "pedigree" as applied to the CISG
Convention and other rules of international business law).
133 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 136.
134 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 741 (referencing RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE
190-92 (1986)); FRANCK, supra note 24, at 143 (same).
135 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 741(emphasis omitted). See FRANCK, supra note 24,
at 146 (referring to "some rationalprinciple of broader import").
136 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 145-48; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 741-43.
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requiring full payment by states whose names began with N-Z. 13 7 This ar-
rangement might be "fair" in that it splits the difference of the debt down
the middle,138 but it would not be coherent because the manner of the allo-
cation does not relate to some rational underlying general principle.
On the other hand, Franck posits a debt forgiveness scheme whereby
the level of forgiveness allotted to each state was a function of its compara-
tive degree of poverty, or was inversely related to its comparative per capita
income.139 Such a scheme would not be consistent, in a strict sense of the
term, because different states would be allocated different amounts of for-
giveness rather than a fixed percentage applicable to each. On the other
hand, such a scheme would be coherent, Franck asserts, because it would
incorporate "principles of distribution which commend themselves ration-
ally."'
40
Whether one would approve of such a result, and even what a catalog
of such "rational principles or broader application" might look like, is not
really so much the point for present purposes. The main point in this re-
spect for Franck is that a rule must be coherent, both with other rules in its
system and with broader principles at work in its system, in order for the
rule to be fully legitimate. Or, as stated directly in the text:
Coherence legitimates a rule, principle, or implementing institution
because it provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the ap-
plication of a rule, to (1) its own principled purpose, (2) principles pre-
viously employed to solve similar problems and (3) a lattice of
principles in use to resolve different problems.141
This Article will conclude that as a further consequence of the insis-
tence of the CISG Convention on uniformity, and also as a consequence of
its attempted independence from municipal legal systems, the Convention
severely compromises the extent to which its terms partake of Franck's co-
herence.142
"' Of course, this would not necessarily result in the repayment of exactly one-half the
outstanding amount, if the early-alphabet states had been more profligate borrowers than the
later-alphabet states. (Franck's hypothetical in the original texts does contemplate varying
amounts of indebtedness among the states.) However, one can conceive of a repayment
scheme based on the first letters of the various states' names resulting in half the debt being
paid and half forgiven, and such an arrangement could be fairly taken as the intendment of
the hypothetical.
138 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 146.
139 Id. at 147; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 742.
140 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 147; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 742.
141 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 147-48 (emphasis omitted).
142 See infra Part V.C. (considering this concept of "coherence" in the context of the
CISG Convention).
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D. Adherence
The fourth criterion composing Franck's idea of legitimacy is adher-
ence, or specifically, adherence to a hierarchy of secondary rules. At the
top of this hierarchy is an "ultimate rule of recognition,"' 43 which in
Franck's view basically corresponds to H.L.A. Hart's concept of a "rule of
recognition."' 44 Beneath the ultimate rule of recognition in Franck's vision
is a "pyramid of secondary rules about how rules are made, interpreted and
applied: rules, in other words, about rules."'4 s Connected to this hierarchy
of secondary rules one finds the "primary rules of obligation, ' '146 such as"cross on the green, stop on the red,' ' 147 that are the "workhorse' '148 of this
hierarchical system.
This kind of legitimacy, in Franck's view, is illustrated by the govern-
mental structures of those states with written constitutions, such as the
United States, France and Germany, in which the constitutions serve as the
ultimate rules of recognition. 149 Franck discusses the issue of whether there
can be said to be such an ultimate rule of recognition in international law. 50
He determines that one such ultimate rule of recognition would be the doc-
trine of pacta sunt servanda, the doctrine that the obligations of a treaty
agreed to by a state must be complied with by that state.
Franck notes that others may assume that the source of the state's obli-
gation to comply with a treaty it has signed is the fact of the state's consent
to be bound evidenced by its signature.152  However, he brands this ap-
proach as fallacious, since if a state were really sovereign except to the ex-
tent of its consent, it would be free to change its mind as to any treaty
obligation and ignore such obligations, when in fact the state no longer con-
143 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 752; FRANCK, supra note 24, at 186.
144 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 183-84; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 751 (each quoting
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (1961)).
14 5 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 752; FRANCK, supra note 24, at 184 (referencing "a
hierarchy of secondary rules identifying the sources of rules and establishing normative
standards that define how rules are to be made, interpreted and applied").
146 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 752; FRANCK, supra note 24, at 184.
147 FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 752.
148 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 184.
1
49 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 753.
150 See id. at 751-53; FRANCK, supra note 24, at 188-91.
151 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 187 (referencing the Latin phrase and discussing the
sources of the binding nature of the rule); FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 756 (referencing
"the notion that when a state signs and ratifies an accord with one or more other states, then
it has an obligation, superior to its sovereign will").
1
52 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 187 ("'Why are treaties binding?' is a question usually
answered by the superficial assertion that 'treaties are binding because states have agreed to
be bound."').
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sents.5 3 Yet states are not free to ignore treaty obligations on the simple
expedient that they decide, for whatever reason, no longer to consent.
154
Accordingly, there must be something other than the state's actual consent
that results in the binding nature of treaties.
For Franck, this something is a community norm of the obligation of
treaties, an ultimate rule of recognition that declares that states are bound by
their treaty obligations. Although referred to in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties as pacta sunt servanda,'55 the rule does not define ulti-
mate obligation because of its enshrinement in the Vienna Convention. 56
Rather, in Franck's view, the community of nations regards it as an ultimate
rule of recognition.5 7 It is binding on each state by virtue of the status of
that state as a member of the international community.1 58 In this way,
Franck observes, a "community... is defined by its ultimate rule of recog-
nition."159
Thus, the final element of Franck's notion of the legitimacy of a rule
can be seen to be directly related to the idea that those to whom the rule is
addressed form a community defined by ultimate rules of recognition that
cap the system of which the rule is a part. Absent such a community, and
such a rule of recognition, this kind of adherence cannot exist and this ele-
ment of legitimacy cannot be complete.
153 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 755 ("It is quite wrong to think that treaties bind
states because they have consented to them. If states were sovereign, the mere act of enter-
ing into a treaty could not 'bind' them in any accurate sense."); Franck, supra note 24, at 187
(referencing the notion that "the obligation of parties to a treaty [cannot] be explained merely
by their mutual consent," and disapproving "the fallacy of this explanation").
l54 Of course, sometimes states do appear to unilaterally decide to violate their treaty ob-
ligations. Franck uses the example of Libya's military operations in Chad to assert that
when a state violates its treaty obligations, the state almost never admits a decision to vio-
late, but rather maintains that no violation has occurred. See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 185-
86. In other words, quite apart from actual practice, the rule does not provide for free viola-
tions.
15s Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, 63 A.J.I.L. 875,
884 (1969); 8 I.L.M. 679, 690 (1969) ("Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.").
1
56 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 187 ("But the binding force of even that statement [from
the Vienna Convention] cannot emanate solely from the agreement of the parties. It must
come from some ultimate unwritten rule of recognition ....").
157 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 756 ("[States] believe themselves to be bound -
which can only be understood as... an ultimate rule of recognition.").
158 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 190 ("obligation derives not from nations' consent but
from their status as members of a community of rules"); FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 753
("Obligation is perceived to be owed to a community of states as a necessary reciprocal in-
cident of membership in the community.").
159 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 190.
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This Article will suggest that problems in defining and delineating a
cohesive community of those actors addressed by the CISG Convention
impair the development of this kind of adherence for its rules.
160
E. Legitimacy and Private Actors
It could be observed that Franck develops his legitimacy theories in the
context of international relations among states. Yet, this Article ultimately
applies Franck's theories to the commercial decisions of private actors.
That is, this Article discusses the legitimacy of the CISG Convention inso-
far as it affects the decisions of private actors to be bound by the Conven-
tion, rather than states. However, it is no less valid to apply Franck's
legitimacy analysis to private actors deciding whether to adopt the CISG
Convention than it would be to apply it to states deciding whether to accept
the control of international norms.
It is true that a primary reason for the appeal of legitimacy theory in
the context of international relations is that the same kind of coercion
backing up domestic law does not exist in the international sphere. 16' Le-
gitimacy theory becomes relevant internationally because there appears to
be a voluntary aspect of a state's decision to obey an international rule, and
it is felt that this voluntary factor might not exist - at least in the same way
-if states were subject to supranational coercion.
However, the decision by private international commercial actors as to
whether to submit their transaction to the CISG is also one that has a vol-
untary aspect; indeed, it is entirely voluntary. As noted earlier, the Con-
vention provides the parties with the ability to opt out of its coverage.162 To
the extent that the voluntary nature of compliance is required for the inquiry
into legitimacy to be relevant, the decision of private actors to submit to the
CISG is no less voluntary - and may be more voluntary in some cases' 63
- than the decision of states to comply with other international law rules.
Furthermore, there is nothing in Franck's theories to suggest that they
apply only to state actors. In fact, his theories suggest quite the contrary
view: that legitimacy theory can be a cogent tool in the examination of na-
1
60 See infra Part V.D. (discussing "adherence" in the context of the CISG Convention
and other rules of international business law).
161 See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 24, at 20 ("Empirically, the Austinian critique of inter-
national law as non-lawv is beyond reproach if one accepts that coercion is a necessary com-
ponent of law and order. Yet ... some, indeed many international rules of conduct are
habitually obeyed by states. ... Thus, to whatever extent any rules are obeyed in the inter-
national system, they must be due to some factor, or mix of factors, other than the Austinian
one.").
162 CISG art. 6 ("The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or ... dero-
gate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions."); see supra notes 96-98 and accompa-
nying text.
163 States cannot choose whether to be bound by customary international law or not,
whereas private actors potentially subject to the CISG Convention can.
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tional rule systems as well. Although he acknowledges differences between
the regimes of national and international law, "the line of inquiry... is not
so different as to justify the alienation of the two branches," such "differ-
ences create a tantalizing intellectual symbiosis."'
164
Most importantly, Franck suggests that a major reason for studying in-
temational legitimacy theory is its possible applications to domestic legal
systems. 16  It is precisely because international law often lacks suprana-
tional coercion that the frequent compliance with it by states commands our
attention when we consider the mechanics, and the possible betterment, of
national legal systems1 66 Franck notes that most contemporary legal phi-
losophers concede that the existence of domestic coercion does not alone
explain the adherence by the populace to the national law.1 67 Referencing
the work of several important modem legal scholars, he notes that these
scholars have considered it necessary to explain, beyond mere force of
arms, why actors even in domestic societies obey the law. 68  Franck's
views on legitimacy are as relevant to this question as the work of any oth-
ers, and he notes that even the words "legitimacy" and "legitimation" have
been used by others, with similar import, in the purely domestic context.
169
It might similarly be felt that the international context affords states
with two stages at which rule compliance is voluntary: the decision
whether to adhere to a treaty in the first place, and the decision whether to
comply with it when relevant events occur.170 On the other hand, it might
164 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 5.
161 See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 706-07 ("Indeed, international law is the best
place to study some of the fundamental teleological issues that arise not only in the interna-
tional, but also in national legal systems.").
166 See id. at 707 ("[it is precisely the curious paradox of obligation in the international
rule system [that should lead to] jurisprudential inquiry .... The answer, if there is one,
may also incidentally prove useful in designing more widely obeyed, less coerced, laws for
ordering the lives of our cities and states.").
167 See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 15 ("Most contemporary legal philosophers deem coer-
cive power necessary but insufficient to secure habitual social assent to governance.");
FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 708 ("While most students of national systems... agree...
that governance requires some exercise of power by an elite supported by coercive force, few
any longer believe the Austinians' claim that this necessary condition is also a sufficient
one.").
168 Particular attention is given to the work of Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas and
Max Weber. See FRANCK, supra note 24, at 15-17 (citing RONALD DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE
(1986); JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy
trans., 1979); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCImT: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds., 1968)).169 See FRANCK at 16; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 709.
170 Of course, with respect to rules invoked pursuant to customary international law, there
would not be a distinct decision to adhere to the rule, since states do not specifically adopt
rules of customary international law. However, for the sake of exposition, the integrity of
this distinction, between the state's decision to adhere to the rule in the first place, and its
decision to comply once relevant events have occurred, will be assumed.
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be felt, the opt-out decision of private actors is only involved at the first
such stage. On this reasoning, it might be presumed that once the private
actors have made the admittedly voluntary decision to accept the Conven-
tion, they would not be free to violate its terms. It could then be asserted
that Franck concerns himself mainly with the second stage of the voluntary
behavior of states, rather than the first stage, and it is at the first stage where
CISG adherence is voluntary.
This comparison actually works the other way, however. That is, this
comparison re-enforces the connection between Franck's approach and
CISG adoption rather than weakens it. The central tenet of Franck's vision
of legitimacy is "compliance pull,' '  a rule is legitimate to the extent it ex-
erts a pull to compliance. Under Franck's view, it is important to know
when a rule exerts compliance pull when the rule concededly applies in the
first place, as in where a treaty has already been signed. If this is the case,
surely it must be even more important, and more valuable, to know when a
rule exerts such compliance pull that parties will want to adopt it as an ini-
tial matter.
The drafters of the CISG expected commercial parties to adopt its pro-
visions when they are not required to. It thus becomes especially important
to examine what it is about a rule such as the CISG that could exert a pull to
compliance under such circumstances, possibly inducing the parties to
adopt its rules. If anything, the Franck inquiry is more critical at this com-
pliance stage than at the latter. 72
IV. SOME SUCCESSFUL RULES OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAW
This Article ultimately determines that the CISG Convention, dis-
cussed in Part II, when examined against Thomas Franck's criteria dis-
cussed in Part I, is substantially illegitimate.1 73 The Article, however,
seeks to do more than simply evaluate the Convention on the basis of
Franck's criteria.
This Article also attempts to establish a practical context for the legiti-
macy evaluation of the CISG. To do this, a preliminary comparison will
first be made. This Article ultimately compares the CISG Convention
against Franck's legitimacy standards, but will first compare the CISG
Convention with three other significant rules of international business law.
This Article asserts that these three sources of international business law
171 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 16; FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 708.
172 It is also worth noting that even at the compliance stage private actors can moderate
their compliance with enunciated rules according to how legitimate the rules appear to be.
Franck uses the example of customs regulations and duties applicable to business travelers
and tourists, which seem to many to be honored much more in the breach than the obser-
vance. See FRANCK AJIL, supra note 25, at 708.
173 See infra Part V (discussing the comparative legitimacy of the CISG Convention).
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have been successful as efforts to state and enforce controlling rules. It also
shows that these three sources satisfy all, or nearly all, the legitimacy crite-
ria developed by Professor Franck. In the final analysis, these three sets of
rules - legitimate from the standpoint of theory and successful from the
standpoint of practicality - furnish a possible basis for gauging the poten-
tial practical success, as well as the current legitimacy, of the CISG Con-
vention.
Before this comparison of practical success can be made, however, it is
advisable to state exactly what is meant by "success" for purposes of this
discussion.
A. An Approach to "Success" in Reviewing International
Business Law Rules
Since the discussion up to this point has noted that different rules of
international law are obeyed to varying degrees, 174 one concept of the suc-
cess of an international rule would turn on the extent to which the rule is
truly regarded by relevant parties as binding. This is the concept of success
on which this Article will focus. Accordingly, when describing a particular
rule of international business law, this Article considers the rule "success-
ful" to the extent that actors in international business, including adjudicat-
ing courts, consider the rule to be actually the regulating rule in those areas
it purports to address. Of course, there can be a variety of reasons for a
failure of such a rule to attain such recognition, including a decision of the
parties to opt out of such a rule.175 However, since this Article focuses on
the actual influence of laws in international business, it is fair to consider
recognition by international business actors in this way, even if such laws
envisage a certain level of voluntary abstention.
It should be emphasized that this idea of success does not refer to the
success a particular international law rule may have in attaining the policy
goal it is designed to accomplish. A treaty, for example, can be scrupu-
lously observed and acknowledged as binding by the parties and yet still not
bring about the desired policy result. The reasons for this kind of failure
can be as various as the diverse subject matters different treaties may deal
with, and in most cases will be related to the substance of the treaties. This
Article focuses on the more jurisprudential question of the success of the
treaty in attaining the status of an acknowledged regulating rule, rather than
the more particularized policy-based idea of success.
This Article considers in turn three sets of international business law
rules that have been successful in this sense. Two of these are multilateral
174 See text accompanying notes 99-108 (alluding to the variable nature of state practice
in obeying international law).
175 A prominent example here, of course, is Article 6 of the CISG Convention. See supra
Part II.E. (discussing this provision).
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treaties: the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to Bills of Lading176 (known as the "Brussels Bill of Lading Con-
vention") and the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Transportation by Air177  (known as the "Warsaw Air
Transport Convention"). The third is not a convention or treaty, but instead
a set of promulgated terms incorporated by international business actors
within the text of their contracts, and thus most frequently enforced under
applicable contract law. This is the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits178 (known as the "UCP"), and will be considered
first.
179
B. The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits, or
"UCP," is the internationally pre-eminent legal regime governing letters of
credit. A letter of credit is a written document expressing the enforceable
commitment of its issuer (usually a bank) to pay money to its addressee (the
"beneficiary") on behalf of a third person (the "account party," usually a
customer of the bank). 80 Usually the terms of the letter of credit describe a
set of documents required for a draw by the beneficiary against the letter of
credit.18 1 The presentation of such documents (conforming to the descrip-
tion in the credit) to the bank is a condition precedent to the bank's obliga-
tion to pay.' 2
176 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 2 Bevans 430, 120 L.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Brussels Bill of Lading
Convention].
177 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, Feb. 13, 1933, 2 Bevans 983, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw Air Trans-
port Convention].
17 8 
NTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PuB. No. 500, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDrrs (1993) [hereinafter 1994 U'CP].
179 This is not the first time that a comparison of international law rules such as these with
the CISG Convention has been suggested by a commentator. See Rosett, supra note 13, at
283 (referencing very briefly the Brussels Bill of Lading Convention and the UCP). How-
ever, to my knowledge this is the first time the comparison has been considered in detail, and
also the first time the comparison has been made with reference to the idea of legitimacy.
180 This definition has been adapted for purposes of this Article from sources operating in
contexts either more general or more particular than the contexts involved here. See, e.g.,
HENRY HARFIELD, BANK CREDrs AND ACCEPTANCES 31 (5th ed. 1974) ("The basic legal
structure of a letter of credit, then, is a legally enforceable commitment by one, the issuer, to
pay money to a second, the beneficiary, on behalf of a third, the account party."); BEN
BERMAN, THE DICTIONARY OF BusINEss AND CREDIT TERMS 124 (Nat'l Ass'n Credit Mgmt.
1983) ("A letter, on behalf of a buyer, addressed by a banker to a correspondent bank guar-
anteeing payment, when evidenced by documents confirming shipment of goods.").
181 See HARFIELD, supra note 180, at 56-69 (describing "Documents Normally Re-
quired").
112 See, e.g., id. at 73 ("The beneficiary must strictly comply with the terms of the credit
to compel performance by the bank.") (emphasis omitted).
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Credit extended by banks is fundamental to modem economies,183 and
nearly an infinite variety of letters of credit and analogous instruments have
been proliferating to meet financial needs.184 Since 1929, the Intemational
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") has been involved in producing uniform
rules governing documentary letters of credit.18 5 The ICC has produced, at
various intervals over the years since 1929, successive versions of these
uniform rules. The most recent is the text of the UCP adopted in 1993,
which became effective on January 1, 1994.186 A breakdown of the various
versions of this ICC document in the intervening years is as follows:








The ICC takes the position that the UCP constitutes "self-regulation by
business," and that it is "devised by experts from the private sector."' 8 The
ICC also has stated that these rules demonstrate "the ability of business
people in countries with differing legal systems to apply their own practical
mechanisms for the conduct of trade."89 Although a certain element of
these statements can be viewed as promotional in character, it does appear
from the roster of the ICC working group on the 1994 UCP that nearly all
participants are indeed senior officers of international banks and financial
organizations located in a variety of world business capitals. 90
It is also clear that in the United States, a major influence on the con-
tinued development and effectiveness of the UCP for many years has been
'
8 3 See id. at 4.
184 See id. at 28.
185 See id. at 225 (beginning discussion of the work of the ICC regarding letter-of-credit
standardization by referring to a 1929 report by an ICC committee to the Amsterdam Con-
gress of the ICC regarding "Uniform Regulations for Commercial Documentary Credits").
186 1994 UCP, supra note 178, title page.
187 Information for this table was derived from HARFIELD, supra note 180, at 225-26;
JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDrr, 3.05 at 3-20 to 3-23 & n.123 (1999);
1994 UCP, supra note 178.
188 See Jean-Charles Rouher, Forward, in 1994 UCP, supra note 178, at 3.
189 See id.
190 See Charles del Busto, Preface to 1994 UCP, supra note 178, at 6-7 (listing nine
working group members, two of which appear to be professors of banking law - one from
the United States and the other from Italy - and the remainder of whom appear to be cur-
rent or former banking executives or ICC officers from France, Germany, Norway or the
United Kingdom).
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the United States Council on International Banking ("USCIB"). 191 The
USCIB has been described as a trade association representing over 350
United States banks engaged in international operations. The letters of
credit issued by USCIB members make up over 80% of the credits issued
by banks in the United States, and the USCIB is the United States repre-
sentative to the ICC for drafting revisions of the UCP.
192
Although the UCP addresses itself to a wide variety of issues that can
present themselves regarding the issuance and administration of letters of
credit, there are some issues that it does not address. For example, when
more than one bank is involved in a letter-of-credit transaction - either to
help provide prompt payment to beneficiaries, or to provide reimbursement
for payments made under another bank's credit,193 or to serve similar pur-
poses - many aspects of the inter-bank relationship are not covered in de-
tail in the UCP. These issues are now dealt with separately in a different
and somewhat less commonly known ICC publication, the "ICC Uniform
Rules for Bank-to-Bank Reimbursements."' 94
Also, the UCP does not deal with issues that are basically general con-
tract law and business law questions that can arise in the context of letters
of credit. This would include such matters as fraud, duress, and compe-
tency of parties. 195 With respect to these and other issues not addressed by
the UCP, other sources of applicable law fill in the gaps. In most United
States jurisdictions, these additional sources of law on letter-of-credit mat-
ters would be Article 5 of the UCC1 96 and the relevant jurisdiction's com-
mon law regarding letters of credit. There is a non-conforming amendment
to UCC Article 5, adopted at various times by four states that may have the
effect of excluding the application of Article 5 when the UCP applies to a
191 See generally James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision
of Article 5 of the UCC, 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 189 (1995) (discussing throughout the
influence of the USCIB on the attempted revision of UCC Article 5, dealing with letters of
credit for purposes of domestic commercial law); James G. Barnes, Internationalization of
Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 215 (1995) (com-
menting on Prof. White's article in the same issue).
192 The material for this description is taken primarily from White, supra note 191, at 190
n.5.
'93 See Dan Taylor, Preface to INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 525,
ICC UNIFORM RULES FOR BANK-TO-BANK REIMBURSEMENTS UNDER DOCUMENTARY CREDITS
at 4 (1995) [hereinafter URR].
194 See id.
195 See DOLAN, supra note 187, at 4-32, 4.04 ("[T]he Customs leave much unsaid and
call for supplemental rules ..... ).
196 See id. at 4-33, 4.05 (suggesting that in United States jurisdictions the UCP and
UCC Article 5 have complementary spheres of application, since "in general, both sources
treat different questions," and that generally "courts apply freedom-of-contract principles
and let the parties' choice of the Uniform Customs prevail over the Code").
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letter of credit.197 However, this version appears now to be applicable only
in the state of New York 98 and it has generally not been nationally signifi-
cant.
The text of the UCP itself does not purport to be, by its own terms,
positive law. However, the UCP provides that it applies to all letters of
credit that incorporate the UCP into their text.199 In these cases, the UCP ef-
fectively becomes part of the letter-of-credit contract between the bank and
its beneficiary, and under prevailing contract law principles the terms of the
UCP become enforceable in the courts of most jurisdictions as though they
were positive law. Some commentators have even gone so far as to say that
the UCP is in effect law in and of itself.
200
The UCP is probably applicable to the overwhelming majority of let-
ters of credit issued each year throughout the world. Commentators have
asserted that the UCP is "incorporated into substantially all cross-border
commercial letters of credit," 20' and that a "large percentage of all letters of
credit in the United States and in other countries" incorporate its terms.
20 2
The ICC, admittedly an interested authority, has declared the acceptance of
the rules and definitions of the UCP to be universal.20 3 There can be no
substantial doubt that the UCP is a successful set of international business
law rules, as this Article defines the parameters of success.
C. The Brussels Bill of Lading Convention
A bill of lading is a document signed by a shipowner or his agent
"which states that certain specified goods have been shipped upon a par-
ticular ship, and which purports to set out the terms on which such goods
have been delivered to and received by the ship.'2 °4 When negotiable, a bill
of lading accordingly serves three functions: as a receipt, a contract, and a
document of title.2 5 Negotiable bills of lading are very commonly used not
197 ALA. CODE § 7-5-102(4) (1993); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-5102[D] (1988); Mo.
REv. STAT. § 400.5-102(4) (Vernon Supp. 1994); N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1995);
all cited in DOLAN, supra note 187, at 4-32 to 4-33, 4.05 & nn. 171 & 172.
198 Of the statutory provisions cited in the immediately preceding note, only that for New
York appears to remain in effect. N.Y. U.C.C. § 5-102(4) (McKinney 1995).
199 1994 UCP, supra note 178, art. 1.
200 See, e.g., White, supra note 191, at 189 ("the UCP are clearly law"), 211 ("The real
reason for the power of the UCP is that it is already the American law . . . ."); see also
Barnes, supra note 191, at 216 (the UCP is "treated as quasi-law in the many countries that
have little or no statutory law governing letters of credit").
201 Barnes, supra note 191, at 216.
202 White, supra note 191, at 189.
203 See Rouher, supra note 188, at 3.
204 ATHANASSIOS N. YIANNOPOULOS, NEGLIGENCE CLAUSES IN OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 3,
n.3 (1962) (quoting 30 HALSBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND 372 (1938)).
205 See id. ("The negotiable bill of lading is a receipt for the goods received for shipment,
evidences the terms of the contract, and is a document of title.... ."). See also BERMAN, su-
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only in facilitating international shipment of goods, but also as supporting
documents for draws under letters of credit covering international ship-
ments.
206
In view of the multiple functions of a bill of lading, bills of lading have
always delineated a complex and multi-faceted relationship between the
party sending the goods for transport (the "shipper," sometimes referred to
as the "cargo interest") and the party effectuating the transport itself (the
"carrier," sometimes referred to as the "shipowners" or "shipping interest").
Most particularly, there is an inherent and basic tension between cargo in-
terests and shipping interests regarding the allocation of risk of loss of the
goods shipped during transport.
217
By the first two decades of this century, commercially prominent
countries had begun to enact legislative compromises resolving this tension
to greater or lesser degrees, but the approaches thus instituted were diverse
and non-uniform.20 8 Accordingly, the unification and codification of rules
stating the extent of shipowner liability under bills of lading was an early
subject for international commercial law reformers.
Specifically, during the late nineteenth century and the early years of
the twentieth century, the International Law Association and the Comit6
Maritime International were substantially involved in the development of
such rules.0 9 The International Law Association was founded in 1873 in an
effort by legal reformers to codify international law, and its early work re-
garding bills of lading was undertaken by a committee composed of mer-
chants, shipowners, underwriters and maritime lawyers.210  The Comit6
Maritime International was founded in 1897 in Belgium, and was initially
created by several national associations of maritime law. 1
pra note 180, at 37 ("A form of agreement by a common carrier identifying the freight and
representing both a receipt and a contract for the shipment.... A bill of lading in the form
of a negotiable instrument is evidence of title to the goods being shipped.").
206 See HARFIELD, supra note 180, at 59-66 (describing bills of lading as "Documents
Normally Required" for a draw on a documentary letter of credit, and describing certain is-
sues that can arise in this connection).
207 See, e.g., Michael F. Sturley, Historical Introduction, in 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA AcT AND THE TRAVAUX PRtPARATOIRE OF THE HAGUE
RULES 3 (Michael F. Sturley ed., 1990) (describing the ways in which this risk of loss was
generally allocated in shipment contracts beginning with the early nineteenth century).
208 See id. at 8.
209 See generally id. at 4-11 (describing in detail the early efforts of both organizations in
this area); see also ALBERT RODRIGUEZ PALACIOS, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
HAGUEIHAGUE-VISBY RULES AND THE HAMBURG RULES 2-7 (The World Peace Through Law
Center 1990) (concentrating on the activities of both groups during the latter portion of this
period).
210 See Sturley, supra note 207, at 4.
211 See id. at 5.
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The work of these organizations in this area extended from 1882
through 1924, and throughout this period both cargo interests and shipown-
ers' interests were significantly vocal, both on the policy issues in general
and the work of the organizations in particular.2 12 Matters significantly so-
lidified in September 1921, at a conference of the International Law Asso-
ciation and its Maritime Law Committee (containing representatives of
carriers, shippers, bankers and underwriters).2 13 After four days of debate
between cargo interests and carrier interests, the members agreed to "the
Hague Rules of 1921," designed for voluntary incorporation by reference in
bills of lading when carriers and shippers so agreed.'
14
Initial reception of the Hague Rules was mixed, however; shipowners
were generally pleased but cargo interests were less satisfied. The main
objection was the voluntary nature of the rules; cargo interests preferred a
mandatory approach through legislation.215 In this context, when the
Comit6 Maritime International next met, in London in 1922, that organiza-
tion revised the Hague Rules into the form of a binding multilateral con-
vention.21 6 Due to a series of procedural complications, the text of this
multilateral convention could not be approved immediately, but was ulti-
mately signed by twenty-five countries on August 25, 1924, at a diplomatic
conference in Brussels. 217 Thus what became known as the Brussels Bill of
Lading Convention was in point of substance generally identical to the 1921
Hague Rules, and for that reason the regulatory scheme embodied in the
Brussels Bill of Lading Convention is often interchangeably referred to as
the "Hague Rules."
The crux of the Brussels Convention is a basic compromise between
cargo interests and shipowners' interests. Under this arrangement, the car-
rier is bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to use due diligence
to make the ship seaworthy, properly man, equip and supply the ship, and
make all holds and other storage chambers fit and safe for the goods.21 8
Any clause in any bill of lading covered by the Convention that purports to
212 See id. at 5 (by 1887, "cargo interests became increasingly frustrated with what they
viewed as overreaching on the part of the carriers"); id. at 9 (the Dominions Royal Commis-
sion recommended compromise legislation on bills of lading for the entire British Empire,
"after hearing evidence from shippers and ship-owners in Britain and the self-governing do-
minions") ; Id. at 11 (detailing lobbying efforts of cargo interests and carriers at the 1921
Hague conference).213 See id. at 9-10.
214 See id. at 10.
215 See id. at 11-12.
216 See id. at 12; PALACiOS, supra note 209, at 3-4.
217 See PALACIOs, supra note 209, at 4.
218 See Brussels Bill of Lading Convention, supra note 176, art. 3(l), 2 Bevans 433, 120
L.N.T.S. 163.
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relieve the carrier of this duty is null and void.219 In exchange for these
protections of the shipper, the carrier is exempt from any liability arising
from a long list of eventualities such as fire, act of God, war or public ene-
mies, riots, civil commotions, and the like, and the carrier is also exempt
from liability arising from any act or neglect in navigation. 220 Furthermore,
the liability of the carrier is in any event limited to an aggregate sum equal
to a fixed monetary amount (in the United States, $500) per package or
unit.
22 1
The Hague Rules, or the Brussels Convention, still remain in force
throughout much of the world today. Commentators have concluded that
the Hague Rules represent a significant and successful effort in the coordi-
nation of international trade law,222 and that the overwhelming majority of
the world's shipping is subject to them.22
The subsequent history of the Hague Rules has not, however, been
static. In the mid-1950's, pressure began mounting for certain changes in
the Hague Rules that would make them, at least assertedly, more responsive
to the demands of modem shipping.224 Ultimately, on February 23, 1968,
an amendatory convention was signed in the Swedish city of Visby.22 1 The
changes worked by the so-called "Hague-Visby Rules" are relatively minor
in scope and do not affect most major provisions of the Hague Rules, ex-
cept that the Visby amendments revised the maximum per package amount
for the carrier's liability.226 The Hague-Visby Rules are not drafted to stand
on their own as an independent set of rules, but rather are drafted in the
form of an express set of amendments to the Hague Rules themselves. The
Hague-Visby Rules are in force for those states that have ratified them, but
the original Hague Rules remain in force for those states which are party to
219 Brussels Bill of Lading Convention, supra note 176, art. 3(8), 2 Bevans 434, 120
L.N.T.S. 165.
220 Brussels Bill of Lading Convention, supra note 176, art. 4(2)(a)-(q), 2 Bevans 435-36,
120 L.N.T.S. 167.
221 Brussels Bill of Lading Convention, supra note 176, art. 4(5), 2 Bevans 436, 120
L.N.T.S. 167. The parties may increase this maximum amount by agreement, but may not
decrease it. Id.
22 See Rosett, supra note 13, at 283.
223 See Sturley, supra note 207, at 23.
224 See PALACIOS, supra note 209, at 17.
225 See id. at 25.
226 Originally, the Visby amendments provided that the new per-package limitation would
be "10,000 [Poincar6] francs per package or unit or 30 francs per kilo of gross weight ....
whichever is the higher." Protocol to Amend the International Convention for Bills of Lad-
ing, Feb. 23, 1968, Art. 2, reprinted in SAUL SoRKIN, 7 GOODs IN TRANSIT, at App. M
(1997). This amount was itself later revised in a further amendatory protocol, whose sole
substantial effect was to replace this figure with an amount generally equal to 666.67 Special
Drawing Rights per package or unit, or 2 SDR's per aggregate kilogram, whichever is
higher. Protocol Amending the International Convention for Bills of Lading, As Amended,
Dec. 21, 1979, Art. II(1), reprinted in id. at App. M-1.
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them, such as the United States, yet have not ratified the Visby amend-
ments.
At about the same time the Visby amendments were being finalized,
developing countries began a concentrated effort to replace the Hague
Rules, on the grounds that they - even as revised by the Visby amend-
ments - placed too heavy a burden on the shipper to the benefit of the car-
rier.22 An effort was then undertaken, under the auspices of UNCITRAL,
to develop a new set of liability rules for bills of lading. Finally, a new
convention was signed in March of 1978 in Hamburg, and its text has be-
come known as the "Hamburg Rules. 228 Under the Hamburg Rules, for-
mer concepts such as a duty of "seaworthiness" and "negligent navigation
and management" have disappeared 2 9 in favor of a more comprehensive
type of liability for the carrier. 230 Although originally signed by 27 states in
1978, the Hamburg Rules did not become effective until 1992, and of the
states that have now ratified the rules, virtually all are developing coun-
tries.231
The United States did not treat the Hague Rules as self-executing, and
instead finally implemented them, after protracted argumentation on behalf
of cargo and shipowners' interests,232 with the passage of a federal statute in
1936 (known as the "Carriage of Goods By Sea Act," or "COGSA"). 3
This legislation is not the only United States federal law dealing with bills
of lading. The Harter Act, originally passed long before COGSA in
1893,3 applies a liability allocation somewhat like that in the Hague Rules
227 See PALACIOS, supra note 209, at 19-20.
22' See id. at 30-31. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Mar.
31, 1978, A/Conf. 89/13, 30th March, 1978, reprinted in SORKIN, supra note 226, at App. L
[hereinafter Hamburg Convention].229 See PALACIOS, supra note 209, at 31.
230 See, e.g., Hamburg Convention, supra note 228, Art. 5(1); SORKIN, supra note 226, at
App. L-9 ("The carrier is liable for loss... if the occurrence which caused the loss ... took
place while the goods were in his charge. . ., unless the carrier proves that he ... took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence ....").
23'UNCITRAL, Status of UNCITRAL Texts, in 26 UNCITRAL YEARBOOK 229, 231
(1995); see also United Nations Treaty Collection (visited Feb. 23, 1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty>. Only one member of the European Union has ratified
the Hamburg Convention (Austria), and of the countries involved in the NATO constellation,
only Hungary and the Czech Republic (relative newcomers) have ratified. Id. Furthermore,
neither China nor Japan has ratified it.232 See Sturley, supra note 207, at 15-23.
233 CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA AcT, ch. 239, 49 Stat. 1207 (1936), codified in 46 U.S.C.
App. §§ 1300-1315 (1994). One source of potential confusion in this area is that various
other English-speaking states have passed domestic statutes, some derivatives of the Hague
Rules, and also called them "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act." The United Kingdom and
Canada are prominent examples.
234 HARTER ACT, ch. 105, 27 Stat. 445 (1893), codified in 46 U.S.C. App. §§ 190-196
(1994). The compromise between cargo and shipping interests expressed in the HARTER ACT
was one of the instigating impulses for the development of the Hague Rules.
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to bills of lading for inland transport within the United States. The Pomer-
ene Ac 5 (also called the Federal Bill of Lading Act) relates substantially
to the federal policy of facilitating the transferability and utility of bills of
lading as commercial instruments, in part in the secondary market for
commercial paper. Even at the state level, Article 7 of the UCC has resid-
ual application to the commercial governance of bills of lading, to the ex-
tent not covered by federal laws or treaties.
Although a variety of federal and state laws apply to bills of lading, it
is well established in United States law that COGSA and thus, indirectly,
the Hague Rules are the governing rules of decision with respect to the is-
sues they cover. Large numbers of federal cases are decided each year ap-
plying, or at least referencing, the provisions of COGSA,2 37 and the United
States Supreme Court in more than one situation has had occasion to ex-
amine its terms.238 Admittedly, there has been critical commentary about
the effectiveness of the Hague Rules and COGSA from a policy perspec-
tive,239 and the development and adoption of the Visby amendments and the
Hamburg Rules indicate this. However, the criterion of success adopted by
this Article is the extent to which international commercial actors actually
regard the rules as the applicable governing standard, and there can be little
doubt that among the ratifying countries the Hague Rules have met this
standard.
D. The Warsaw Air Transport Convention
The Warsaw Air Transport Convention was signed in 1929 and was
ratified by the United States in 1934.240 One of its major underlying pur-
23s49 U.S.C. §§ 80101-80116 (1994).
236 UCC Art. 7 ("Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title");
UCC § 7-103 ("To the extent that any treaty or statute of the United States,... or tariff, clas-
sification or regulation filed or issued pursuant thereto is applicable, the provisions of this
Article are subject thereto.").
237 It would appear from recent searches of electronic databases that over 50 federal cases
since January of 1995 have referenced COGSA or the Hague Rules in one context or an-
other.
23 In the most recent case, and the one treating COGSA in the most detail, the Court held
that COGSA's prohibition of any provision of a bill of lading lessening liability other than as
provided in COGSA did not preclude the operation of a bill-of-lading arbitration clause. See
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). See also Robert C.
Herd & Co., Inc. v. Krawill Machinery Corp., 359 U.S. 297, 301 (1959) (interpreting
COGSA's limit of liability with respect to its possible application to stevedores or agents).
A brief reference is more peripheral in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585,
604 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239 See, e.g., Erling Selvig, Unit Limitation and Alternative Types of Limitation of Car-
rier's Liability, in SIx LECTUR.S ON THE HA(UE RULES 105, 120-25 (Kurt Grbnfors ed.,
1967) (expressing dissatisfaction with the mechanism of a per-package liability maximum).
240 Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12,
1929, 49 Stat. 3000, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 note (1994).
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poses was the encouragement and development of the then fledgling inter-
national air transportation industry.24' Accordingly, an overriding theme of
the Convention is the establishment of limitations of various kinds on the
liability of commercial air carriers in the event of harm suffered by passen-
gers or goods transported.
The Convention declares in general terms that the carrier shall be liable
for damage sustained by passengers on board an aircraft or in the course of
embarking or disembarking.242 A similar declaration imposes liability for
damage to checked baggage or goods, if the damage took place during the
transportation by air.24 However, these general rules are subject to signifi-
cant limitations.
First, in general, the carrier is not liable - in spite of the preceding
statements of liability - if the carrier proves that the carrier and its agents
have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage, or that it was im-
possible to take such measures.244 Furthermore, even in those situations in
which the carrier is found to be liable under its terms, the Convention as
originally adopted limited the amount of the carrier's liability to 125,000
French francs per passenger.245 The Convention goes on to withdraw these
limitations on the carrier's liability if the damage is caused by the "willful
misconduct" of the carrier,246 and "by special contract" the carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability than that specified in the
Convention.
There have been several additions and modifications to the Conven-
tion's terms over the years. Probably the most significant is the "Montreal
Agreement,, 248 which increased the maximum amount of carrier liability
(originally 125,000 French francs) to U.S. $75,000 per passenger.249 Under
the Montreal Agreement, participating carriers also waived the non-
negligence defense otherwise afforded in the Convention - that is, the op-
portunity to show, for example, that the carrier had "taken all necessary
241 See, e.g., Katherine A. Staton, The Warsaw Convention's Facelift: Will It Meet the
Needs of 21st Century Air Travel?, 62 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1083, 1085 (1997) (a primary goal
of the Convention was to "limit the potential liability of the young air carrier industry in ac-
cidents").
242 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 17, 2 Bevans 989.
243 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art 18(1), 2 Bevans 989.
244 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 20(1), 2 Bevans 990.
245 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 22(1), 2 Bevans 990.
246 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 25(1), 2 Bevans 991.
247 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 22(1), 2 Bevans 990.
248 Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, May 13, 1966, reprinted in LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW
CONVENTION ANNOTATED, at 317 (1988).
2 49 See I.H.PH. DIEDERIKs-VERSCHOOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW 93 (1993); Staton,
supra note 241, at 1086.
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measures" to avoid the damage - up to the $75,000 maximum.250 The
Montreal Agreement, however, was a private agreement concluded in 1966
between the participating carriers and the Civil Aeronautics Board of the
United States. 1 It is effective pursuant to the provisions of the Warsaw
Convention allowing carriers and passengers to assent to liability limits
higher than those specified in the Convention "by special agreement.i
25 2
However, the Montreal Agreement, having been developed and negotiated
by United States authorities, only applies to international flights for which a
point within the United States is an agreed stopping place, point of depar-
ture or destination.5 3
In spite of the numerous modifications and alterations to the Warsaw
Air Transport Convention over the years,25 4 of which this Montreal Agree-
ment is but one example, the weight of authority attests to its success as a
fact of international law.25 5 Some commentators express frank criticism of
some of its substantive policy provisions,25 6 but this does not detract from
its success as that term is used in this Article - success as an acknowl-
edged source of the applicable law.
257
250 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 93; Staton, supra note 241, at 1086.
251 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 92.
252 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 22(1), 2 Bevans 990.
253 See DIEDERICKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 93; Staton, supra note 241, at 1085-
86.
254 Examples would include the Hague Protocol of 1955 (increasing the maximum liabil-
ity amount by means of a multilateral convention rather than private agreement, but to an
extent judged insufficient by United States authorities; it became effective in 1963); and the
Guadalajara Convention of 1961 (expanding the scope of the Warsaw Convention to deal
with the development of aircraft chartering; it entered into force in 1964). See generally
DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 55-56 (describing and citing these agreements in
more detail); see also Staton, supra note 241, at 1085 (discussing the Hague Protocol).
255 See DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 55 ("The rules of the Warsaw Con-
vention are being applied all over the world and have demonstrated their reliability and use-
fulness."); "Its attempts to unify and clarify the regulation of international carriage have, in
many ways, been successful for many years.... The system has provided... predictability
which in itself provides stability and a degree of fairness." MARK W. ZACHER & BRENT A.
SUTrON, GOVERNING GLOBAL NETwoRKs: INTERNATIONAL REGIMES FOR TRANSPORTATION
AND COMMUNICATIONS 105 (1996) (quoting CAROL BLACKSHAw, AVIATION LAW AND
REGULATION 221-22 (1992)) [hereinafter Global Networks]; NiCOLAS MATEESCO MATTE,
TREATISE ON AiR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 383 (1981) ("The application that it has had up until
now, has demonstrated its usefulness and relevance.").
256 See, e.g., Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today, 62
J. AIR L. & COM. 1071, 1073 (1997) ("As an American, I have never been afraid of de-
nouncing the Warsaw Convention. And I think there are many Americans out there.., who
join me .... It will not be a disaster for the United States, and nor will it be a disaster for
the world." The general tenor of this author's remarks is more positive, however.).
257 Indeed, the United States briefly denounced the Warsaw Convention in 1965, but
withdrew its denunciation later the same year. See, e.g., U.S. to Continue Adherence to War-
saw Convention, 5 I.L.M. 767 (1966).
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The provisions of the Warsaw Air Transport Convention remain the
subject of further evolution and development. The International Air Trans-
port Association ("IATA") in 1995 and 1996 adopted a series of "Intercar-
rier Agreements" that authorities believe will ultimately have the effect of
liberalizing the Convention's regime further, although the new arrangement
is not without its impediments to full effectiveness.258 In addition, the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization ("ICAO"), an agency of the United
Nations, is currently developing an international treaty that authorities be-
lieve could eliminate maximum carrier liability limits. 259 However, during
its life the Warsaw Air Transport Convention has been the governing stan-
dard, no matter how much some have disagreed with its policies.
The Warsaw Air Transport Convention, for which only the French text
is authoritative, 260 appears to have been regarded by the United States as
self-executing, and has not been specifically implemented by federal legis-
lation.261 However, it has been widely applied and interpreted in United
States courts, 262 and on several occasions has been the subject of important
and influential cases before the United States Supreme Court.263 Air travel-
ers all over the world, of course, have cause to be aware of its existence -
although probably not its terms - by virtue of the coverage notice printed
258 It is said that under the IATA Agreements carriers would waive all maximum-liability
limits and waive the non-negligence defense for damages up to 100,000 SDR's. Desmond
T. Barry, Jr. & Thomas J. Whalen, Unlimited Liability: The New Ball Game in International
Transportation, 64 DEF. CouN. J. 381 (July 1997); Staton, supra note 241, at 1104-07.
259 International Effort to Update 68-Year Old Treaty on Passenger Liability Picks Up
Momentum, AIRLINE FINANCIALNEws, Vol. 12, No. 20, May 19, 1997.
260 Warsaw Air Transport Convention, supra note 177, art. 36, 2 Bevans 994 ("This con-
vention is drawn up in French in a single copy").
261 As noted earlier, the Convention has not been codified within the United States Code,
but appears appended to the Code's text as an ancillary law and directive. 49 U.S.C. §
40105 (1994).
262 Citations and headnotes for cases referencing its provisions in the United States Code
Annotated are voluminous, occupying 35 pages in the main volume alone. 49 U.S.C.A. §
40105 note (1998 West).
263 E.g., Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985) (holding that liability under the Con-
vention can only be occasioned by an "accident" within the meaning of Article 17 of the
Convention, that such an accident must be an unexpected or unusual event or happening ex-
ternal to the passenger, and that when an injury results from the passenger's own internal re-
action to normal aircraft operations (in this case, hearing loss incurred during descent prior
to landing in conditions of usual cabin pressure), injury has not been caused by such an acci-
dent); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217 (1996) (holding that the Con-
vention imposes liability only for legally cognizable harm, that cognizable harm is to be
determined in accordance with applicable domestic law, that in this case (the Soviet shooting
of KAL Flight 007 over the Sea of Japan) cognizable harm was to be determined under the
U.S. Death on the High Seas Act, and that under that Act plaintiffs could not recover loss-of-
society damages).
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on the passenger tickets issued by carriers serving the over 120 states 264 that
are currently parties.
It should also be noted that the Warsaw Air Transport Convention does
not govern all issues pertaining to aircraft and airline operation; for example
domestic governmental agencies in virtually all states exercise responsibil-
ity in the areas of safety and economic regulation. Even within the area of
carrier liability for accidents, the Convention largely leaves some questions;
for example, certain issues regarding the nature of the damages cogniza-
ble;265 to be decided under applicable local law. However, within its sphere
of coverage it has served as the recognized applicable rule of law - though
on occasion unpopular - and has been in that respect a successful rule of
international law.
V. THE COMPARATIVE LEGITIMACY OF THE CISG CONVENTION AND
SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW RULES
The discussion in the Introduction established that it is still uncertain
whether the CISG Convention will attain the level of success desired by its
partisans. Although an ample number of states have become parties to the
CISG, the number of reported decisions applying or even referencing the
CISG in the ratifying countries is, in all save a few, quite small. In the
United States, reported judicial opinions substantively applying the Con-
vention are extremely few in number. 66 And indeed, in this country at
264 See accord, DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR, supra note 249, at 1 ("When a person boards an
aircraft as a passenger and reads the small print on his ticket he suddenly realizes he is bound
by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention."); OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADViSOR, U.S. DE1"T
OF STATE, PuB. No. 9433, TREATiES IN FORCE 329-30 (1997).
265 See, e.g., Zicherman, supra note 263 (determining that the federal Death on the High
Seas Act, on the facts there involved, determined the extent of legally cognizable harm under
the Convention); see also MATTE, supra note 255, at 382 (the Convention "has set new
bounds on an action in liability, boundary limits, but without regulating the essence itself')
(quoting Les confiits de lois en mati~re de droit adrien, 2 R.C. Ac. HAYE 285 (1934)).
26 As stated earlier, see supra note 21 and accompanying text, only one United States
case (accounting for two opinions) has reached a decision on the merits based on the terms
of the CISG. See Delchi Carrier S.p.A. v. Rotorex Corp., 1994 WL 495787 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
9, 1994), affd in part and rev'd in part, 71 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995). Four other opinions
have contained substantive discussions regarding the application of the CISG, but only in the
context of whether the CISG's rejection of the parol evidence rule should defeat a petition for
or grant of summary judgment; see MCC-Marble Ceramic Ctr., Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova
d'Agostino S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998); Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. Euro-
pean Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. I11. 1998); and Claudia v. Olivieri Foot-
wear Ltd., 1998 WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998); or whether the existence of a contract
was sufficiently shown under the CISG so as to give effect to an arbitration clause in the
purported contract, see Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Infl Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). The Filanto district court decision was appealed, but the appellate opinion was de-
cided on other grounds and made no reference to the CISG. See Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich
Int'l Corp., 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1993).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 19:1 (1998)
least, advice given by commentators to legal practitioners often includes the
suggestion that clients opt out of the Convention, either in whole or in part,
or at least the observation that this is an advisable course.267
With the passage of time, unambiguous evidence of the Convention's
success may develop, but that evidence has not yet materialized and in the
meantime there are these possible indications to the contrary. If contra-
indications of success in this sense continue to be prominent, any perceived
explanation for such a lack of success would best be rooted in the voluntary
nature of the Convention's applicability to private actors. After all, it
would be the decisions of private actors not to adopt the Convention that
would be largely responsible for its failure to serve as an acknowledged
Several other opinions have included brief mentions of the CISG, but these references to
the Convention have been cursory, non-substantive or insubstantial. In none of them has the
CISG been a basis for the holding or detailed analysis of any kind. See Attorneys Trust v.
Videotape Computer Prod., Inc., 94 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 1996); Beijing Metals & Minerals
Import/Export Corp. v. American Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993); Huntington
Int'l Corp. v. Armstrong World Indus., 981 F. Supp. 134 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Kahn Lucas Lan-
caster, Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 1997 WL 458785 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997); Helen Kaminsky
Pty. Ltd. v. Marketing Australian Prod., Inc., 1997 WL 414137 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1997)
(CISG held not to apply); Graves Import Co., Ltd. v. Chilewich Int'l Corp., 1994 WL 519996
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1994); S.V. Braun, Inc. v. Alitalia, 1994 WL 121680 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6,
1994); Interag Co. Ltd. v. Stafford Phase Corp., 1990 WL 71478 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1990);
Orbisphere Corp. v. U.S., 726 F. Supp. 1344 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989); Promaulayko v. Amtorg
Trading Corp., 540 A.2d 893 (N.J. Super. 1988); and GPL Treatment, Ltd. v. Louisiana-
Pacific Corp., 894 P.2d 470 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (dissenting opinion).
All the appellate opinions issued in cases that briefly mentioned the CISG were decided
on other grounds, and none of them mentioned the CISG. See Orbisphere Corp. v. U.S., 765
F. Supp. 1087 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1991), appeal after remand, 880 F. Supp. 865 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1995); Promaulayko v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 562 A.2d 202 (N.J. 1989); GPL Treatment,
Ltd. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 914 P.2d 682 (Or. 1996).
267 See, e.g., Allen M. Shinn, Liabilities Under Article 42 of the UN Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, 2 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 115, 118 (1993) ("[P]arties involved
with intellectual property issues would be wise to contractually exclude Article 42, and
specify in their contracts exactly how such issues will be resolved."); Dennis J. Rhodes, The
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Encouraging
the Use of Uniform International Law, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 387, 389 (1992) ("[T]he lack of
cases interpreting the CISG necessarily makes parties wary of using it."); B. Blair Crawford
et al., New Rules for Contracting in the Global Marketplace: The United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ("CISG'), C395 ALI-ABA 115, 130
(1989) (suggesting that the ability to exclude implied warranties under UCC § 2-316 may be
preferable to unknown exclusion doctrines under other municipal laws or under the CISG);
Timothy N. Tuggey, The 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods: Will A Homeward Trend Emerge?, 21 TEx. INT'L L.J. 540, 554 (1986)
("Large multinational corporations and state-owned enterprises ... will more likely benefit
from the advice of well-informed counsel and avoid unpleasant surprises by 'opting-out' of
the Convention or by remaining under the CISG in a favorable forum."). See also GABRIEL,
supra note 8, at 24 ("[The] authority of parties to an international contract to exclude the
Convention from a contract that meets the 'international requirement' may lead to avoidance
through fear of the unfamiliar.").
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source of governing rules. Accordingly, any explanation for lack of success
should incorporate an analysis of the voluntary behavior of private parties
in this context.
Thomas Franck's theories of legitimacy furnish just such an analy-
sis. 268 Under his views, the pull to compliance of any rule of law is related
to its legitimacy.269 Accordingly, a lack of acceptance of the CISG by pri-
vate actors behaving voluntarily may properly be viewed as a lack of com-
pliance pull on the part of the Convention that reflects a relative lack of
legitimacy. A review of Franck's four factors of legitimacy, as they pertain
to the CISG Convention, is therefore in order. This Article undertakes such
a review, and delineates substantial indications that the Convention lacks a
significant amount of the four characteristics of legitimacy. A lack of le-
gitimacy may thus be inferred as an explanation for any continued lack of
the Convention's success.
This conclusion will be strengthened by a comparison with rules of in-
ternational business law that have experienced significant success. Three
such successful rules were examined in Part IV of this Article. Accord-
ingly, these three sources of international business law will also be briefly
reviewed, and will be shown to possess substantial legitimacy indicators.
Their observed success provides further evidence that any lack of success of
the CISG relates to a probable deficiency in its legitimacy.
In keeping with this analysis, this Article takes each of Franck's four
legitimacy factors in turn, determining the extent to which the CISG Con-
vention possesses features indicative of each such characteristic. The dis-
cussion of each factor also includes a brief review of the successful
international business law rules described above, to determine the extent to
which they possess such features as well.
A. Determinacy
It was noted earlier that Franck's idea of determinacy in its most basic
form is related to textual clarity.270 This Article will not directly question
the CISG Convention on the clarity with which it is written. Rather, this
Article focuses on two somewhat more sophisticated aspects of determi-
nacy. First, attention will be directed to a special kind of determinacy de-
veloped in Franck's discussion: process determinacy. Second, this Article
observes that the difficulty inherent in any attempt to generally amend the
Convention creates an additional issue of determinacy.
268 See supra Part III.E. (explaining the application of Franck's legitimacy theory to be-
havior of private actors).
269 See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
legitimacy and compliance pull).
270 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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1. Process Determinacy.
Process determinacy requires that if ambiguities and other difficulties
of interpretation arise, there be a forum or fora that are able and authorized
to resolve these difficulties, and that the fora themselves bear the other indi-
cia of legitimacy.27'
A problem arises here because of the Convention's insistence on uni-
formity across jurisdictional lines. From the beginning of the Convention's
life, commentators have been wary of the different governments in the dif-
ferent member countries interpreting and enforcing the Convention in di-
vergent ways, thereby potentially defeating the goal of uniformity.272 The
text of the Convention demonstrates that the drafters were aware of this
potential problem,273 and included fairly explicit directions on this point.
We have seen that the introductory portion of the Convention explicitly
provides that "[i]n the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
application ... .,274 This could be taken to mean that cases involving spe-
cific facts and issues decided under the Convention should be decided con-
sistently with cases involving similar facts and issues in the courts of other
countries. Precedent taken from other countries could be urged to control
domestic precedent, at least if there is a conflict or tension between the two.
Also as noted earlier, 75 the gap filling provision of the Convention so-
lidifies this inference. We saw earlier that when there are gaps in the cov-
erage of the Convention in areas that are otherwise within its scope, the
Convention discourages the filling of such gaps by reference to applicable
domestic law. Rather, the Convention indicates that questions are to be
settled first "in conformity with the general principles on which [the Con-
vention] is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law."
Emphasis on uniformity of this kind can have a significant impact on
process determinacy. As noted earlier,277 there is no supranational court to
interpret and enforce the CISG Convention.278 Accordingly, if the com-
271 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of "process
determinacy").
272 See, e.g., BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 10, at 18 ("[IWt is not sufficient that the single
States adopt the Convention. It is equally important that its provisions be interpreted in the
same way in various countries").
273 See supra notes 76-80.
274 CISG art. 7(1).
27 See supra text accompanying note 81.
276 CISG art. 7(2) (emphasis added).
277 See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
278 The International Court of Justice, in the Hague, of course, is a supra-national court of
sorts with potential jurisdiction over a broad variety of international law issues. However, its
statute provides that only states may be parties in actions before it. Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, Art. 34(1), 3 Bevans 1179, 1186. Of course, states in
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mentators and the Convention's text are to be taken seriously, domestic
courts in each state party to the Convention are called upon to keep abreast
of, interpret, follow and apply decisions of foreign jurisdictions.
Apart from difficulties arising from varying languages, legal cultures
and judicial systems, 279 a foreign state court simply does not offer substan-
tial legitimacy for the municipal polity within another state. The nationals
of a given state normally have no say over the appointment or removal of
the judicial or adjudicatory officers of foreign states. Furthermore, the tri-
bunals of a given state largely lack the other legitimacy factors within other
states foreign to them. They do not possess or command the same degree of
pedigree, coherence and adherence outside their jurisdictions.
But most fundamentally, the proffered type of uniformity deprives the
courts of each jurisdiction of the full interpretive authority they would oth-
erwise have to interpret the Convention. By virtue of the necessity of hon-
oring the precedents of foreign states in preference to their own, the courts
of a given state can never be certain how long a given domestic decision
will have force, even within the jurisdiction from which it originated. A
countermanding foreign case, possibly from a higher-level court within the
foreign jurisdiction, could be resolved with an opposite result at any time
thereafter.
It is true that some commentators have begun to modify the insistence
on uniformity that had previously been advanced.280 These observations are
of recent origin, however, and remain a chiefly minority view. Further-
more, they remain at odds with the fairly explicit directives of the Conven-
tion's text, if the text is to be taken seriously.
This kind of process determinacy problem does not exist with any of
the other international business law rules previously examined. The UCP
for letters of credit is not positive law in most jurisdictions,281 and is only
binding because letter-of-credit parties have incorporated it by reference
into their letters of credit. As such, the UCP is in essence a set of contrac-
tual terms subject to the full scope of review by the courts of each country
whose business actors use letters of credit. The UCP therefore imposes no
impediment to process determinacy, and no barrier, in this respect, to its le-
gitimacy.
appropriate circumstances can adopt the causes of their nationals, but this hardly seems a
satisfactory means of approaching issues under the CISG Convention.
279 See, e.g., BIANCA & BONELL, supra note 10, at 19-20 (noting the difficulties imposed
by the linguistic variations and differing legal systems).280 See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, CISG Case Law: A New Challenge for Interpreters?, 17 J.L.
& CoM. 245 (1998) (suggesting that there may be limitations on the CISG requirement of
autonomous interpretation); Harry M. Flechtner, The Several Texts of the CISG in a Decen-
tralized System: Observations on Translations, Reservations and Other Challenges to the
Uniformity Principle in Article 7(1), 17 J.L. & CoM. 187 (1998) (noting, for example, that
"[t]he Convention does not and cannot mandate absolute uniformity").
281 See supra text accompanying note 199.
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The Hague Rules on bills of lading, stated in the Brussels Bill of Lad-
ing Convention, have been incorporated into the domestic law of most
countries adhering to the Convention.282 The United States implemented
the rules as COGSA.283  Under this framework, the Hague Rules simply
form another aspect of the international business law of each state party to
them. Courts in each such state have full authority to interpret the Hague
Rules in the context of their domestic law, filling any gaps that may exist in
their coverage with concepts from that domestic law, to the extent they see
fit. Accordingly, the Brussels Bill of Lading Convention allows for full
process determinacy, like the UCP and unlike the CISG Convention.
The Warsaw Air Transport Convention has not been codified in the
statute law of all states parties,284 but as is the case with the Hague Rules,
there is no provision of them impairing process determinacy. The courts of
each jurisdiction are free to interpret them in the context of their own
precedents. Indeed, the broad scope of subject matter left for resolution at
the national level has been commented upon and observed. Accordingly,
the Convention offers no threat to legitimacy on this basis.
2. Indeterminacy Due to Difficulty of-Amendment.
Franck observes that rules operating in a complex environment gener-
ally are not binary in character2 s and need to be more complex to ade-
quately address the situations to which they relate. This greater complexity
threatens the clarity and precision needed for determinacy; process determi-
nacy is thus required so that adjudicatory proceedings can ultimately help
assure such clarity and precision.
This Article asserts that there is another procedural aspect of rules that
can affect their continued determinacy: the ease with which such rules can
be amended. With the complexity inherent in the situations they address,
non-binary rules need to be able to accommodate changing circumstances.
Rules in these kinds of instances can be so outmoded or obsolete that they
no longer apply to such situations with the necessary degree of clarity and
precision. If such rules can be amended with relative facility, this threat to
determinacy is minimized.
The successful rules of international business law under consideration
here furnish apt examples. The UCP for Documentary Credits, for instance,
have been amended and re-issued on average once every ten years since
282 See supra note 233 (referring to the United Kingdom and Canada as examples, in ad-
dition to the United States).283 See supra note 233 and accompanying text (providing the U.S. session law citation for
COGSA).
284 See, e.g., supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text (discussing effectiveness in the
United States).
285 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (regarding the distinction between
complex and binary rules).
CISG Convention and Thomas Franck's Theory of Legitimacy
19:1 (1998)
their inception.286 This has, among other things, enabled the UCP to keep
abreast of innovations in technology and financial products over the years.
Indeed, the expectation that new revisions of the UCP are relatively regular
is one of the most characteristic features of the document.
The Hague Rules, as stated in the Brussels Bill of Lading Convention,
have similarly shown themselves amenable to perceived needs for change.
The Hague-Visby amendments demonstrated adaptability for those states
that thought them necessary by allowing for an adjustment in the calcula-
tion of the maximum per package amount of carrier liability. This capacity
for adaptability was further demonstrated by the second protocol providing
for yet another adjustment on the same point.287 Finally, the adoption of the
Hamburg Rules, substantially restating the law of bill-of-lading liability,
also evidences a degree of flexibility for those states adhering to their
terms.288 Of course, not all states have acceded to each of these revisions,
but this further demonstrates the flexibility of the Hague Rules regime,
which is able to accommodate such variations to address developing needs
and yet remain essentially intact.
Finally, the various amendatory protocols and agreements that have
been applied to the Warsaw Air Transport Convention over the years, such
as the 1966 Montreal Agreement,289 are also relevant here. However con-
tentious such actions may sometimes have been, they indicate that the li-
ability regime embodied in the Warsaw Air Transport Convention's
framework is sufficiently adaptable to avoid this kind of determinacy prob-
lem.
Against these examples, prospects for the CISG Convention in this re-
spect are not necessarily bright. Since the Convention contains no mecha-
nism for a less-than-unanimous means of amendment, any change in its
terms would need to be agreed to by all Contracting Parties in order to be
effective among all of them.290 Thus no prospect of frequent revision by a
monitoring organization exists, as with the UCP. The intricacy of the
CISG, combined with its broad scope, may also make the prospect of serial
multilateral revision - as has occurred with the Hague Rules and the War-
saw Air Transport Convention - less likely in this context.
Accordingly, the need for unanimous agreement for any generally ap-
plicable amendment, combined with the Convention's character as a de-
tailed, intricate and yet broadly ranging set of rules, raises a significant
286 See supra note 187 and accompanying text (including a chart showing the frequency
of the reissuances of the UCP).287 See supra note 226 (describing these two amendatory protocols in more detail).
288 See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text.
289 See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (regarding the general law of treaty
amendments).
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issue of its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 29' This in turn would
seem to adversely impact its continuing determinacy.
B. Symbolic Validation
The two forms of symbolic validation, as discerned by Franck, are "rit-
ual" and "pedigree. 292 Ritual does not present an issue for discussion in
this Article, but there is a clear question of pedigree, as that concept is de-
veloped by Franck. For Franck, pedigree is not merely a matter of heredi-
tary lineage; it has a broader meaning as well. In a more general sense of
the term, a rule can be said to have pedigree to the extent the person or in-
stitution promulgating the rule is perceived as "deserv[ing] to be obeyed" or
"deserv[ing] to be taken seriously."293
The pedigree issue arises in the context of the circumstances in which
the CISG Convention was prepared and adopted. As the earlier discussion
demonstrated,294 the Convention was the result of several stages of interna-
tional negotiations. Those who undertook and completed these negotiations
are to be congratulated for their dedication, determination and analytical
competence. The endeavor, however, was undertaken chiefly by diplomats
and legal academics.295 The members of the UNCITRAL working groups
are generally not manufacturers of goods sold in international trade and are
not brokers and dealers of internationally shipped and sold commodities.
Rather, they are for the most part career diplomats with the United Nations
and other national or multi-lateral organizations as well as academic
authorities on trade law in general.
296
Furthermore, it is not clear that there was a universally felt compelling
need for such action on the part of manufacturers, traders, brokers and deal-
ers in international commerce at the time of the Convention's adoption. The
UNCITRAL working groups and the other academic and ministerial
authorities working on the Convention no doubt perceived such a need, and
indeed they may have been correct in their perception. But as far as the re-
cord shows, the perception was theirs rather than that of the commercial
291 On the amendment point, see generally Rosett, supra note 13, at 296.
292 See note 122 and accompanying text.
293 See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
294 See supra Part II.A. (describing the organizations involved with drafting at the various
stages of the CISG's preparation, including the preparation of its precursors).295 See HONNOLD TREATISE, supra note 3, at 49 ("[UNIDROIT] requested a distinguished
group of European scholars to prepare a draft of a uniform law for the international sale of
goods."); id. at 51 ("UNCITRAL representatives proved to be a wholesome mix of academic
specialists in commercial and comparative law, practicing lawyers, and members of govern-
ment ministries with years of experience in international lawmaking.").
296 See id. at 53 ("In the Working Groups, national representatives come together from all
parts of the globe .... All of the representatives have primary, full-time responsibilities in
their Universities or Ministries.").
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actors who would be most directly affected by the Convention. In consid-
ering the issue of pedigree, it is this perception that is crucial.
The nature of the need perceived by the Convention's drafters is eluci-
dated by reference to the NIEO movement, coeval with the Convention's
adoption and alluded to in its terms.297 Although no claim is made that the
NIEO movement was responsible for the Convention, its underlying prem-
ises are indicative of dominant intellectual perspectives in international af-
fairs at the time. Some of the values298 inherent in the NIEO movement
informed the preparation of the Convention, and these were values of the
academic and political drafters, rather than those of the private business
actors who would come under the Convention's jurisdiction.
It must be emphatically stressed at this point that no disrespect or dis-
regard for the negotiators and drafters of the CISG Convention is stated or
implied. In particular, there is no intimation that the work as a whole lacks
"intellectual pedigree," much less that the individuals involved lacked per-
sonal pedigree. The appellation, "pedigree" has a very particularized
meaning in this context. It only pertains to the perception of those affected
by the completed rule as to their idea of the extent to which the rule and its
originators require obedience.299
Those responsible for the preparation of the CISG Convention were
not taken from the ranks of the commercial actors to be affected, but were
rather highly-placed officials and authorities with a broad policy-oriented
approach. The negotiators, both at the Working Group stage and at the
diplomatic conference, were not necessarily responsible to manufacturers,
traders, brokers and dealers of goods in international trade. Instead, it ap-
pears that they were most likely responsible to their diplomatic and profes-
sional superiors. It is thus fair to state that the CISG can be perceived as
being a "from the top-down" endeavor, which affects the perceptions of
those addressed, and thus its "pedigree."
The same is not true of the successful international business law rules
under consideration. The UCP is published and regularly revised by the
ICC, an international trade group.3" The persons involved with the ICC for
the monitoring and revision of the UCP are chiefly bankers and other per-
sons engaged in the issuance and handling of letters of credit.0 1 Prominent
297 See supra Part II.B. (providing background on the NIEO movement).
298 For example, the preamble to the Convention refers to the goal of developing interna-
tional trade "on the basis of equality and mutual benefit," and by its terms refers approvingly
to the "New International Economic Order." The goals of the NIEO movement, in turn,
featured the redressing of the "fundamental inequality of economic strength" between North
and South as being among the most important. See supra text accompanying note 62 (quot-
ing North-South, supra note 58, at 32).
299 See supra notes 125-31 (discussing the general concept of "pedigree" as an aspect of
"symbolic validation").
3
00 See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
301 See supra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
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among those advising the ICC on the continuing revisions of the UCP are
trade groups such as the United States Council on International Banking,
which represents, and is presumably responsible to, hundreds of banks in-
volved in international banking operations.0 2
The Brussels Bill of Lading Convention was entered into after many
years of vociferous, energetic and committed argument between cargo in-
terests and shipowners' interests. 3  It was ultimately adopted when the
large majority of all business interests concerned realized that uniformity in
Bill of Lading liability would be essential for the continuation of the trade
affected.304 Although multi-national political organizations were involved
in its preparation, working groups of the International Law Association and
the Comit6 Maritime International were staffed primarily from trade groups
and the cargo and shipowners' interests themselves.3 °5
The Warsaw Air Transport Convention was adopted with the avowed
goal of encouraging the fledgling air transportation industry.30 6 Although
its substantive provisions are subject to frequent criticism, including by
those in the industry, such criticisms go to the content of the Convention,
and not to pedigree, in this sense, of its drafting.30 7
As an additional and perhaps somewhat more subtle point, some of the
substantive features of the CISG Convention may occasion a problem of
symbolic validation. As noted earlier, the pedigree of a multilateral con-
vention depends in part on the extent to which the convention's rules are
perceived as "codification," as opposed to the "development" of new law.30 8
In some of its more often-discussed provisions, the CISG incorporates
terms that are at variance with existing regimes in states with dominant
trading positions.30 9 A certain number of variations may well have been in-
evitable when drafting a document such as the CISG. However, the im-
pression may nevertheless remain in some quarters that in areas such as
these the Convention is an exercise in development, and not simply codifi-
cation. To this extent, this may pose another pedigree problem.
302 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
303 See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
304 See supra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
306 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
307 See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
308 See supra text accompanying note 131 (setting forth a quotation by Oscar Schachter
regarding the need for such conventions to be considered codifications for greater authorita-
tiveness).
31 Perhaps the most well-known examples would be the Convention's treatments of the
statute of frauds, see CISG art. 11, parol evidence, see CISG art. 8, and the "battle-of-the
forms" problem, see CISG arts. 18 & 19, all of which vary substantially from the rules appli-
cable, for example, under Article 2 of the UCC, see UCC §§ 2-201, 2-202 and 2-207.
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C. Coherence
In order to have coherence, a rule of international law must provide a
reasonable connection with specific principles previously employed to
solve similar problems and also with general principles (a "lattice of princi-
ples") used to solve a variety of different problems.3 10 The problem here is
that the CISG Convention has been designed to stand entirely on its own as
a self-sufficient set of rules for the international sale of goods. In inter-
preting and applying the CISG, its text actively discourages recourse to
principles developed in other circumstances.
In discussing the determinacy of the CISG, it was already shown that
two of the Convention's provisions in particular might impair its process
determinacy.311 One was the Convention's directive that courts interpreting
the CISG give regard to its international character and the need to promote
uniformity.312 The other was the requirement that coverage gaps be filled
first "in conformity with the general principles on which" the Convention is
based, and only then to fall back on domestic law.313 These features of the
Convention are quite relevant to the issue of coherence as well.
The designers of the CISG Convention were quite intent that it should
stand on its own. If the new Convention had been perceived as being
closely linked to any particular legal structure or legal tradition, a problem
of insularity or parochialism, such as that which plagued the 1964 Hague
Conventions, 314 might have impaired the CISG's acceptability. However,
in the effort to disassociate the CISG from particularized national frame-
works, the designers created a legal code that is substantially isolated from
surrounding context. An isolated set of rules cannot maintain the kind of
coherence with other rules that is required for optimal legitimacy.
This is to be contrasted, for example, with the approach under UCC
Article 2. Under the UCC framework, provisions of Article 2 are to be
supplemented in each jurisdiction by common-law rules, including the gen-
eral principles of law and equity and rules related to capacity, agency, es-
toppel, fraud, and similar matters.315  It is also understood in the UCC
regime that each jurisdiction's courts are able to fill gaps in coverage with
that jurisdiction's common law rules specifically relating to sales of goods.
Because UCC Article 2 can and should be interpreted to enmesh with
each adopting jurisdiction's common law and non-UCC statutory law, it
possesses coherence in Professor Franck's sense. The CISG, on the other
310 See supra text accompanying note 141.
3t1 See supra Part V.A.1. (addressing process determinacy in the context of the CISG
Convention).312 See CISG art. 7(1).
313 CISG art. 7(2).
314 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
315 See UCC § 1-103.
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hand, explicitly disfavors resort to domestic statutory law and domestic case
law, both with regard to general interpretation and gap filling. To that ex-
tent, then, the CISG suffers from a deficiency in this kind of coherence.
CISG coherency can also be compared to the analogous circumstances
of the other three international business law rules under review. The UCP
for letters of credit, which is not positive statutory law in most jurisdictions,
is applied by parties and courts as an element of the contract between the
parties.316 As such, its interpretation and application are fully subject to
other relevant legal rules, whether statutory or case law in origin, existing in
the governing law at issue. Furthermore, the UCP rules are such that they
would not normally conflict with other types of rules in related areas, such
as liability for negligence and other tort law concepts. For example, in the
United States, UCC Article 5 (both former and current versions) provides a
substantial source of non-UCP rules that supplement each jurisdiction's
letter-of-credit law. Accordingly, there is ample opportunity for the UCP to
be perceived as coherent, in Professor Franck's sense, within a "lattice of
principles" used to solve relevant problems.
The Hague Rules, embodied in the Brussels Bill of Lading Convention,
like the CISG Convention, are a self-contained set of legal rules - in this
case dealing with the allocation of liability in connection with goods cov-
ered by a bill of lading.317 However, the self-containment in this context
does not work in isolation. The Brussels Convention only goes as far as
does liability for goods; many other issues are left for relevant domestic
law. In the United States, for example, the Harter Act, the Pomerene Act
and UCC Article 7 still have residual, and in some cases, substantial impact
on the law relating to bills of lading, as does the case law in each of these
areas.31 This leaves ample context for the application of related principles
from similar situations that are unrestricted by the terms of the Hague
Rules.
The Warsaw Air Transport Convention also covers a relatively small
range of issues, at least in conceptual terms.319 The structural focus of the
Convention is liability for damage resulting from accidents, leaving the
numerous other legal issues surrounding the aviation industry - whether
for preventive safety, economic regulation, or other governmental goals -
for domestic law. Accordingly, the international rules are not isolated as a
result of the adoption of the Convention, and there are opportunities to build
coherence with related domestic principles.
316 See supra notes 199 and 281 and accompanying text.
317 See Sturley, supra note 207, at 9 ("Unlike domestic statutes, which were to be read in
the context of domestic law, the new rules [i.e., the Hague Rules] were designed to create a
self-contained code (at least in the areas it covered) that would not require reference to do-
mestic law.").318 See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
319 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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One factor relevant to this type of coherence, at least in the context of
the United States, is the characteristic of an international treaty as self-
executing or non-self-executing. The nature of the CISG Convention as a
self-executing treaty may help to create the conceptual isolation largely re-
sponsible for this coherence problem. By contrast, the Brussels Bill of
Lading Convention is not self-executing, and the framework of the UCP
does not demonstrate the characteristics of a self-executing treaty. The
Warsaw Air Transport Convention, however, has been viewed as self-
executing, and yet it does not have the same kind of coherence problem.
Perhaps self-executing status creates the risk of a coherence problem, but
other factors, such as a more narrowly delineated scope of application, help
to mitigate this risk.
D. Adherence
A rule can be said to have adherence, in Professor Franck's view, if the
rule is connected to a hierarchy of rules headed by an ultimate rule of rec-
ognition. 20 The obligation to obey the ultimate rule of recognition arises
incident to the obligee's status as a member of the community the rule ad-
dresses. Indeed, Franck observes that a community "is defined by its ulti-
mate rule of recognition," 321 as that phrase was developed by H.L.A. Hart.
In the context of the international business community, a rule could be
said to have adherence if the people and firms it affects can be described as
a community, and if the need to obey the rule springs from, or is at least
related to, the status of those persons and firms as members of the commu-
nity.
The buyers and sellers principally affected by the CISG Convention do
not constitute such a community. They are engaged in the manufacture,
marketing, purchase and sale of all maimer of goods.322 Their characteris-
tics and operations are too diverse to form a single cohesive community.
This lack of adherence is clear upon comparison with the other three
rules of international business law under consideration. The UCP for letters
of credit serves a readily observable community of bankers and their im-
port/export clients who rely on letter-of-credit financing. Although there
may be many different kinds of goods (and services) covered by letters of
credit, all are being financially backed by precisely the same kind of docu-
ment, which has the same fundamental structure regardless of the type of
320 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
321 FRANCK, supra note 24, at 190.
322 The scope of the "goods" covered by the CISG Convention is extremely broad. The
Convention does not explicitly define the term "goods." However, it excludes by its terms
only a relatively few categories of property, leaving the strong inference that all other cate-
gories of personal property are included. Those items excluded according to inherent prop-
erty type are: stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money; ships,
vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; and electricity. CISG art. 2(d)-(f).
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transaction involved. The community, thus defined, is well acknowledged
by its members. The United States Council on International Banking,
which bears a substantial share of responsibility for the monitoring of the
UCP, is an example of the extent to which banks and their officers view
themselves as having a commonality of interest in this area.323 Similarly,
although the ICC is an umbrella organization of sorts, its UCP operations
are geared specifically to bankers, and specifically those issuing, confirm-
ing and servicing letters of credit.324 These interests constitute a community
which in this endeavor is governed by the rule in question, the UCP, and
which can be expected to share the characteristics of the type of community
Professor Franck describes.
Similarly, the shipping interests and cargo interests addressed by the
Hague Rules can readily be seen to define a community. These interests
were the primary participants in the development and delineation of the
Hague Rules over a period of many years. Although the goods they trans-
port are very diverse, they all are relying on one method of transport (ocean
shipping) and one type of documentary instrument (a bill of lading, usually
negotiable) to accomplish their purpose. The specific impact on liability
occasioned by the bill of lading has established a commonality of interest
that defined the community in Franck's sense. Analogous observations pre-
sent themselves concerning the Warsaw Air Transport Convention and its
role in encouraging the community of the early aviation industry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current levels of reported adjudication under the CISG Convention
in many countries raise the question of the extent to which the Convention
is regarded by courts and affected parties as a suitable law of international
sales of goods. The withholding of approval by some commercially signifi-
cant countries and the skepticism of some commentators are additional in-
dications that the Convention may ultimately fall short of its aspirations.
To the extent that the CISG Convention is not being broadly accepted
in its intended role, the situation may relate to a lack of a certain kind of le-
gitimacy.
This lack of legitimacy stems inter alia from the Convention's insis-
tence that courts interpret it in internationally uniform ways, the difficulty
of its amendment, the extremely broad scope of its coverage, the circum-
stances of its preparation, its determination to stand alone as a self-
sufficient law of international sales distinct from other municipal laws, and
the large number of parties it affects.
Greater legitimacy for the CISG Convention might be achieved, or at
least aided, by modifications to the Convention that decrease its emphasis
31 See supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
324 See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
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on internationally uniform interpretation, supply a more workable process
of amendment, include a more welcoming stance toward the incorporation
of non-Convention law in its application and involve affected business peo-
ple and business interests in the resolution of such questions.
